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ABSTRACT
This thesis aims to increase current understanding of the ways in which 
large firms make and implement industrial building investment decisions. 
The study reported involved an investigation, from the corporate 
perspective, of the decision and implementation stages of capital 
investment projects in two large UK firms.
The orientation of the study is towards a consideration of investment 
decision making and implementation as a problem for management involving a 
process of resource allocation occurring over time and throughout the 
corporate organisation. Drawing on research in the business 
administration area of social science, the process model of resource 
allocation by Bower (1970) is used as a conceptual framework and to 
suggest propositions for study which direct attention at key features of 
the process.
By viewing corporate capital investment decision making and implementation 
within this framework - and as part of an in-depth, case-based, 
exploratory research strategy - rather than in terms of its financial or 
economic consequences, the study reaches an understanding of the ways in 
which both firms studied actually made and implemented their capital 
investment decisions. The analysis utilised the study propositions to 
explore the resource allocation process and yields important observations 
on the role of the construction industry in the investment decision 
process and of the role of the corporate client in the construction 
process.
The central finding is that the implementation of corporate capital 
investment, seen from the firm's perspective, is more a continuation of 
the process of capital investment than an end result of it. The study 
suggests that the construction industry participates rather more in the 
investment decision process, and the corporate client participates rather 
more in the construction process, than is generally recognised in the 
literatures on corporate capital investment and construction management.
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1.1 INTRODUCTION: PROBLEM AND FOCUS 
1.1.1 The role of corporate capital investment
Corporate capital investment is an important element in the economic 
growth of individual firms and of the wider economy. It is important also 
for the construction industry, as a significant proportion of corporate 
capital investment is devoted to buildings. This varies between 
individual firms and between industries, but on average UK firms allocated 
about 25 per cent of capital investment resources to new building work in 
1991 *. This accounts for a relatively large proportion of total new 
construction output, amounting to more than 50 per cent that year2.
As a subject for study, corporate capital investment occupies a central 
position in the microeconomic theory of the firm and in theories of 
finance and corporate strategy. It also features prominently in a public 
policy context where assumptions about the determinants of investment 
underpin policies aimed at managing the economy as a whole3. In 
recent years much theoretical and empirical attention has been devoted to 
consideration of the choices and decisions of individual firms in the 
allocation of investment funds. However, in many cases the line of 
enquiry leaves off where the investment decision ends. The question of 
how corporate decisions to invest in physical assets are implemented has 
been less well explored. More specifically, relatively little 
consideration has been given in research to the process by which firms 
implement building investment decisions.
1.1.2 Outline problem statement
Two problems in particular for the firm's management help bring into 
sharper focus the issues to be investigated. The first concerns the 
involvement of the construction industry in the capital investment 
process. Construction's role is traditionally seen in terms of 
implementing that part of the investment decision involving building 
work. However, by providing concepts, plans, programmes, etc, on which 
the costs of the investment project are based, construction
participates in the process long before implementation begins. How the 
firm manages this contribution has not, as far as is known, been explored 
in the context of the firm's capital investment process.
The second concerns the involvement of the firm's management as corporate 
client in the construction process. During construction, the firm's 
requirements may change such that the building originally conceived is no 
longer suitable. The key question for the firm's management is then: "How 
do we ensure that we get the building we need?".
1.1.3 Focus and perspective
The central thesis to be developed in this study is that implementation is 
a part of the process of capital investment, and not simply an end result 
of it. The argument is developed more fully below and in chapters 2 and 3 
but is asserted for now to help put what follows in context.
The research reported examines how corporate building investment decisions 
are made and implemented. Its primary focus is on the large manufacturing 
firm investing in a new factory for its own use. The study takes as its 
starting point the manufacturing firm's need for a new factory and, from 
that perspective, seeks to examine how the firm obtains a suitable 
building. In doing so it draws on recent work in the business 
administration area of social science which examines the capital 
investment process in terms of its organisational and political aspects 
rather more than its economic or financial ones (for a summary, see Marsh 
et al, 1988). The analysis yields observations on the corporate 
client's role in factory building projects and a conceptual framework by 
which this role may be examined.
1.1.4 Points of departure
This work spans a number of academic disciplines. It does not, however, 
address the central concerns of all of them. In an ultimate sense it is 
about the behaviour of people in organisations and about personal and 
entrepreneurial motivation. It does, however, have a more specific 
purpose.
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By exploring the corporate client's role in building procurement as part 
of the capital investment process it signals a point of departure from 
many theoretical treatments of capital investment. These not only ignore 
the construction contribution, but consider implementation as an outcome 
of a decision to invest. It will be argued that the data presented later 
in this thesis indicate that the investment and implementation processes 
are not so easily separated.
The firm's perspective is taken in the belief that it will provide 
valuable new insights into the building procurement and management 
process. By concentrating on the corporate client's role, this study 
departs significantly from previous work in the area of building 
procurement and management which has tended to concentrate on the points 
of view of the property and construction industries.
The next section provides an introduction to the theoretical and empirical 
foundations of the present research (which are considered in more detail 
in chapter 2). This includes a discussion of the rationale for the focus 
and perspective taken. It is followed by sections on the research design, 
the research territory and the structure and outline of the remainder of 
the thesis.
1.2 FOUNDATIONS OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH
The present research arises from a number of distinct but related lines of 
enquiry concerning:
1. corporate capital investment;
2. organisational behaviour and decision making;
3. building procurement and management; and
4. factory buildings as inputs to production.
1.2.1 Purpose and process in corporate capital investment
The central problem of investment is how best to allocate the resources 
available; in essence the "economic problem"4. Whether to further
11
the wealth of nations or of individuals, the efficient allocation of 
resources has been the subject of serious enquiry for a considerable time.
Attention has also focused on the investment decisions of firms. A good 
deal of this has arisen from a long standing interest in the determinants 
and outcomes of investment so as to refine prescriptive theories of 
economic choice (Copeland and Weston, 1983). Trends towards increasing 
industrial concentration in the latter half of this century (Hannah, 1983) 
have been accompanied by a growing awareness of and interest in the 
administrative aspects of organisations (Simon, 1945). The decision 
processes of large firms in particular have thus attracted considerable 
attention in recent years.
1.2.2 A conflict of paradigms
While research has examined both the motivation5 for, and the 
process6 of corporate capital investment, analysis has taken a 
number of perspectives: financial, economic, organisational and 
behavioural. Different approaches have, not surprisingly, been unable to 
reach a consensus about either purpose or process. What is more 
surprising, however, is the intractability of many of the questions raised 
and solutions offered, particularly when viewed across academic 
disciplines.
In particular, theories of corporate finance and microeconomics, partly to 
facilitate economic analysis, make assumptions about the nature and 
location of corporate capital investment decisions: in short, such 
decisions consist of rational choices between investment alternatives made 
by top management (Bierman and Smidt, 1988). On the other hand, empirical 
studies of the process in the business administration area have evolved 
from a growing awareness of the firm as a political organism and from a 
view of man within administrative organisation7 . These locate 
investment choices with personnel lower down the management hierarchy and 
emphasise the political and organisational context as being of crucial 
importance8.
12
This apparent conflict has provided fruitful topics for scholarly enquiry 
in a variety of disciplines. Its currently unresolved status suggests the 
need for further study. However, such lack of resolution is not 
particularly conducive to prescription, which may help explain why the 
building management and procurement literature has virtually ignored this 
conflict up to now9.
1.2.3 Capital investment and building procurement
The question of how building investment decisions are implemented is 
largely absent from the literature on capital investment decision making. 
Moreover, it will be argued that the construction procurement and 
management literature also pays relatively little attention to the 
construction process as a continuation of a capital investment decision. 
This is primarily because it lacks both a focus on the client's 
perspective and a consideration of the corporate client as a complex 
organisation operating in a dynamic and changing business environment.
First, although there is considerable emphasis within this literature on 
the early stages of the construction process, these are rarely seen from 
the client's perspective or as part of the capital investment process. 
The literature on briefing, for example, tends to be prescriptive and to 
focus on problems facing building designers rather than on the problems 
clients may have in identifying and articulating their requirements (Kelly 
et al, 1992). This issue is returned to in chapter 2.
Secondly, research in building management and procurement has only 
recently begun seriously to look at why and (to a far lesser extent) how 
firms invest in new buildings 10. A large body of the literature 
effectively ignores any consideration of the corporate client as an 
organisation and the closely related issues of managerial and 
administrative behaviour. Indeed, the dominant tradition in this 
literature has included the implicit assumption that corporate clients 
behave much like rational individuals and that, as in conventional finance 
and economic theory, investment decision making is vested in top 
management 11 . In particular, the implications for construction of
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the findings of empirical research into the process of capital investment 
within construction's corporate client organisations remain unexplored.
1.2.4 The focus on manufacturing firms building new factories
The large manufacturing firm investing in new factory buildings for its 
own use provides a useful focus for exploring some of these questions for 
the following reasons.
First, much of the empirical research into corporate capital investment in 
recent years has focused on the investment decisions of large firms 
procuring production facilities for their own use (for example, Bower, 
1970; King, 1975; Marsh et al, 1988). Little attempt has been made up 
to now to explore the implications of this recent work for project 
implementation and building procurement. As the nature of the present 
study is essentially exploratory (see below and chapter 4), it would be 
premature to begin such an exploration in other than manufacturing 
industry.
Secondly, the large firm is now the dominant instrument for the production 
of goods all over the developed world. Little consideration has been 
given in construction research to the large firm as construction client.
Thirdly, the contribution of industrial building investment to the 
well-being and international competitiveness of UK manufacturing industry 
has been debated within both the construction and manufacturing industries 
for some time (Institute of Directors, 1962; Drury, 1981; Industrial 
Building Bureau, 1984).
And fourthly, factory buildings have a particular status in orthodox 
economic theory as inputs to production 12. While the central 
concern of investment may be economic, this research and its methodology 
are more concerned with capital investment and implementation as processes 
involving the interaction of people and information which require to be 
managed. Furthermore, the concern is with the process of building 
procurement rather than the inherent nature of factory buildings.
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Nevertheless, consideration of how firms acquire new factory buildings as 
portrayed within microeconomic theory raises important questions for the 
corporate client's role in the construction process. For this reason the 
nature of factory buildings is discussed briefly below.
1.2.5 The particular nature of factory buildings
The treatment of factory buildings as factors of production is somewhat 
problematic within microeconomic theory. Manufacturing firms require land 
and buildings, labour, machinery and financial capital for the production 
of goods, but economic theory does not deal specifically with how firms 
acquire that factor of production represented by buildings. In orthodox 
microeconomics, buildings fit into the production process like any other 
factor of production: in the profit maximising firm additional buildings 
will be taken on until their marginal productivity equals their marginal 
cost (Curwen, 1974; Crew, 1975).
However, Fothergil et al (1987) argue that the particular nature of 
factory buildings means that, unlike other production factors such as 
labour and machinery, these "smooth marginal adjustments" implied by 
theory are not possible in the case of buildings. This is because 
buildings are relatively indivisible, so that physical constraints of 
site, building form, technology and so on constrain the extent to which 
buildings may be continually adjusted in line with changing production 
requirements 13 . Although this critique relates primarily to the 
long term flexibility and adaptability of industrial buildings, a detailed 
consideration of which is outside the scope of this research, it is 
relevant also to change occurring during the building process.
The building process takes time. Although microeconomic theory makes no 
provision for this, changes to the firm's production requirements 
occurring during this process are presumably accommodated by making the 
smooth marginal adjustments to the building under construction which 
Fothergil et al argue are difficult to accommodate afterwards. 
However, the building process, involving the commitment of considerable 
intellectual, physical and financial resources, cannot easily accommodate
15
these continuous adjustments, particularly as it progresses through time. 
How the firm, as corporate construction client, may make these adjustments 
is not at all clear. Indeed, it will be argued below that the 
construction industry discourages change to projects from an early stage 
precisely because the task of incorporating change is perceived to be 
problematic.
1.3 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
1.3.1 Intention and aims
The rather wide ranging discussion presented thus far has introduced the 
main lines of enquiry which motivate the present study and the theoretical 
background to the problems to be investigated. It also suggests a 
potentially rewarding direction for the examination of these problems and 
for an exploration of related issues.
In that the orientation of theories of corporate finance and 
microeconomics is toward the costs and financial benefits of capital 
investment, they appear to say very little about how the firm's management 
actually make and implement capital investment decisions. An alternative 
approach is therefore required for an examination of the problems raised 
above. The construction procurement literature - with its lack of a 
client perspective - also appears to fall short of providing a useful 
framework for an examination of its corporate client's problems.
Although these conflicts are discussed in more detail in chapter 2 below, 
it may be noted that the intention in this study is to consider the 
problems raised as part of management's wider problem of resource 
allocation. Central to this study is the view that the problems, 
considered from this perspective, raise important organisational and human 
questions which a management approach will allow for a serious exploration 
of the issues involved. The study draws on recent work in the business 
administration area which has focused on the capital investment problem as 
a process of resource allocation through time involving the firm's
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management. This orientation provides valuable new insights into the 
resource allocation process which are particularly relevant to the present 
research.
The work by Bower (1970) in particular provides an analytical framework 
within which management action during the resource allocation process may 
be examined. By describing the process as occurring across many levels of 
the corporate hierarchy and over long periods of time, Bower's resource 
allocation model suggests a set of propositions for study which direct 
attention at key features of the process. The aim of this study is to 
examine these propositions to help explore how the firm's management 
manage the construction contribution to capital investment projects and 
how they ensure that the firm gets a suitable factory building. The model 
and the research propositions are discussed in more detail in chapter 3 
below.
1.3.2 Approach
Given the focus and perspective taken and the problems to be examined, the 
study is based on a detailed and intensive examination of the process of 
capital resource allocation in respect of a factory building project in 
each of two large manufacturing firms. A more detailed discussion of the 
research strategy and methodology is provided in chapter 4 below, where 
particular emphasis is placed on the essentially exploratory nature of the 
research.
1.3.3 A note on uncertainty
Fundamentally, the problem of implementing industrial building investment 
decisions would be greatly simplified if the firm could be certain about 
the factory buildings it required well into the future. In this case, 
implementation would be largely as currently characterised within 
investment theory, ie constructing that project which has been defined in 
the investment decision.
However, because of the indivisible and long-lived nature of buildings, it 
may be expected that firms contemplating acquiring new buildings will
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normally take a long term view of their building requirements. Indeed, 
Fothergil et al (1987) argue further that as the acquisition of a new 
factory is typically part of a major strategic decision involving 
considerable managerial effort and disruption, such decisions tend to be 
taken infrequently and reluctantly. It would appear therefore that the 
willingness (as well as the ability) of the firm continually to adjust 
that part of its productive capacity represented by buildings may be 
limited.
Whether the manufacturing firm displays such a reluctance to undertake 
major capital investment projects is a question for research. The point 
here, however is that as the future is unknowable, the firm's prediction 
of future needs is inherently uncertain. Indeed, if uncertainty depends 
on time, then it may be expected that the further into the future the firm 
must look - the longer the new building is expected to last - the more 
uncertain will be the firm's estimate of its building requirements. In 
any event, the nature and scope of a factory building defined within an 
investment decision is uncertain; the extent of this uncertainty is of 
less interest here. And although an investigation of problems related to 
this uncertainty may seek to examine whether the firm may make more 
accurate predictions, this study is concerned with the problem of managing 
the building procurement process in conditions of uncertainty.
1.4 THE RESEARCH TERRITORY
This section outlines the research territory to be investigated: a more 
detailed discussion of the choice of firms for analysis is presented in 
chapter 4 below.
1.4.1 The large manufacturing firm
Although the present research may be said to be project-oriented, in that 
it deals with management action on individual projects, the unit of 
analysis is the large manufacturing firm. More specifically, it is those 
managers and personnel involved in a capital investment decision leading 
to the construction of a new factory building.
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The large manufacturing firm has grown to a position of pre-eminence in 
industrial society in recent years. It has also attracted considerable 
attention from organisation researchers, particularly in the business 
administration area. As will be seen, studies of the internal decision 
processes of large firms provide much material for the present study. In 
particular, these studies argue that the management of large firms, 
because of their size and organisational complexity, merits special 
attention. This study will argue that capital resource allocation and 
building procurement create particular problems for the firm's management 
for similar reasons.
1.4.2 Investment and building procurement
The capital investment process provides a somewhat unique and temporary 
setting for the examination of management action. The boundaries of the 
process are described in chapter 4 below. It may be noted here that the 
primary interest is in management action concerned with a particular 
investment project, although the emphasis on the firm will enable relevant 
material from outside of the immediate project boundaries to be 
accommodated. Finally, a particular type of capital investment decision 
is covered here - that leading to the procurement of a new factory 
building for the firm's own use as a production facility.
1.5 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
This thesis is presented in eight chapters. This first chapter provides 
an introduction to the problems to be investigated, the focus and 
perspective taken and the theoretical background. It outlines briefly the 
research strategy and the locus of the research including the primary unit 
of analysis.
Chapter 2 begins with an overview of the development and importance of 
large firms. It develops two main themes through the literature which 
have been identified in chapter 1. These concern corporate capital 
investment and new building procurement. Corporate capital investment is 
discussed in terms of its organisational and political aspects and
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particular attention is paid to the management of the process and to the 
treatment of investment project implementation. Models discussed include 
those by Bower (1970) and King (1975). Additionally, the literature on 
building procurement and management is reviewed with a particular view to 
exploring the perceptions and understanding of the corporate client 
embedded within it.
In chapter 3 an analytic framework by Bower (1970) is presented and 
discussed. Propositions for research are then derived from this 
framework.
Chapter 4 provides a discussion of the research strategy and a review of 
methodological issues. In particular, details of the case study approach 
are given together with a discussion of qualitative research techniques 
for data collection and analysis.
The detailed case studies together with a preliminary analysis of case 
material are presented in chapters 5 and 6. One chapter is devoted to 
each case study.
Chapter 7 considers the research propositions in the light of the case 
studies and preliminary analysis presented in chapters 5 and 6. It 
provides comparisons and contrasts between the cases and examines the 
usefulness of the propositions to help explain management action during 
capital investment decision making and implementation.
Chapter 8 concludes with a consideration of the implications of the 
research findings for the firm's management, for construction management 
and for further research.
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1.6 FOOTNOTES
1 Author's estimates based on Central Statistics Office (1992), The 
Blue Book, 1992 Edition, Table 13.2.
2 Author's estimates based on Department of the Environment (1992) 
Housing and Construction Statistics, March Quarter 1992, Part 2, 
Table 2.3.
3 For example, capital allowances to encourage certain categories of 
industrial building investment assume that high capital costs inhibit 
investment.
4 See for example, Archibald (1971), pp9-10.
5 See for example, Bromiley (1986).
6 For a summary, see Marsh et al (1988).
7 A spur to this may be found, in particular, in Arrow (1951) where the 
tensions between individual and collective action in the context of 
business organisations are explored; and in Simon's (1945) widely 
cited exposition of human decision making in organisations.
8 Empirical studies of corporate capital investment have tended to 
concentrate on large firms. Marsh et al, for example, refer to 
the "classic dilemma of large decentralized organisations" and argue 
that, in large companies
"..final authority for major investments is vested in top 
management. ...(but) most strategic development in such companies 
comes from the divisions, rather than being top down." (1988, p2)
See also Bettis (1983) who queries differences between finance and 
corporate strategy paradigms, particularly as to assumptions about the 
competitive nature of markets. Some of these apparent conflicts are 
examined further in chapter 2.
9 The predominantly normative orientation of the building management and 
procurement literature is discussed in chapter 2 below.
10 See, for example, Kelly and Male (1991) on client's value systems; 
Bresnen and Haslam (1991) on client project management practices.
11 The point is argued more fully in chapter 2 below.
12 Production buildings have also attracted the attention of theorists 
outside of orthodox economics. Bon, for example, wishes to focus a 
theory of building economics on buildings used for the production of 
goods to relate it closely to the theory of capital of the Austrian 
school. He therefore distinguishes between buildings used for 
production - capital goods - and buildings, such as dwellings, which 
are consumption goods used for the satisfaction of human needs (1989, 
pp 5-6 and 28-9).
13 For an extension of this argument, see Fothergil et al (1987), 
chapter 4 and pp 56-7.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
This chapter examines the literature on the ways in which large firms make 
and implement capital investment decisions, concentrating in particular on 
two broad streams of study; the first in the business 
administration/corporate strategy area, and the second concerning building 
procurement and management. Although the discussion begins with an 
overview of the importance of large firms as agents in the economy and as 
subjects for study, the discussion is primarily at the level of the 
individual firm.
The argument is developed that within the large firm, capital investment 
is a 'bottom-up' process where proposals for major investment arise from 
the operating divisions to progress up the management hierarchy before 
being reviewed by top management. Such a process tends to receive little 
attention in theories of finance and microeconomics and, in particular, 
within the literature on building procurement and management, where 
investment decision making tends, by contrast, to be characterised as "a 
single act of top management deliberation" 1 . The discussion 
explores some of the implications for the implementation of building 
investment decisions of this apparent conflict of paradigms and concludes 
with key questions for research.
2.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF LARGE FIRMS
2.2.1 Importance as economic agents and subjects for study
The increase in industrial concentration and the development of the large 
business enterprise has been a feature of the economic histories of both 
the US and the UK - and, for that matter, most other economically advanced 
Western countries - in the latter half of the present century (see Hannah, 
1983; Goold and Campbell, 1987). More recently, however, the growth in 
dominance of the large enterprise has slowed. Hannah (1983) argues that:
"the 1970s and early 1980s proved, like the 1930s and 1940s, to be 
a period of lull in the advance of the corporate economy"2.
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Despite this, large firms continue to dominate most aspects of economic 
activity. Davies et al (1991) examined concentration in UK 
manufacturing industry in 1979 and 1986 to argue that the leading two or 
three firms dominated most markets and that market leadership was 
relatively stable over that period3. Furthermore, there have been 
sharp increases in merger activity by manufacturing firms since the mid 
1980s - both in terms of number of firms and value of assets 
involved4 - pointing to an advance in merger-led expansion of large 
corporations fuelled by a stock market boom predicted by Hannah in 
19835 .
2.2.2 Strategy, structure and problems for management
Ever since Berle and Means (1932) argued that a separation of ownership 
from control had occurred in the large modern corporation, considerable 
interest has been directed towards the workings and activities of large 
firms. Although much of this interest has concerned testing or extending 
Berle and Means's thesis (eg in the UK see Nyman and Silberston, 1978; 
Cubbin and Leech, 1983), the problems of organising and managing the large 
firm have also received much attention.
In particular, the relationship between the firm and its business 
environment has been the subject of enquiry for some time. For example, 
Galbraith (1967) argued that the large firm sought to control 
uncertainties in its environment through the 'technostructure', an 
apparatus for group decisions of non-owning managers who had replaced the 
traditional owner-entrepreneur6. This technostructure allowed the 
firm to grow by integrating its operations and extending its sales in an 
effort to stabilise its environment. A rather different perspective was 
taken by Chandler (1962) who examined corporate growth as a function of 
the firm's strategy of diversification.
Chandler's study is particularly relevant to the present research in its 
examination of the structural and organisational implications of growth by 
diversification. He examined growth in some 70 large US corporations and 
noted that growth strategies of diversification and geographical expansion
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led to administrative problems for top management. The problem of 
managing the disparate needs of different markets became more difficult 
with increasing size, especially where the strategy of product-market 
diversification was pursued.
The development of the multi-divisional structure at Du Pont and the 
General Motors Corporation in the USA in the 1920s (and in Imperial 
Chemical Industries Ltd - ICI - in Britain in the 1930s) was a direct 
response to these problems and enabled diversification strategies to be 
pursued. Such strategies and structures were rapidly adopted by the 
majority of the large American international companies and, somewhat 
later, by the majority of large British companies also (Channon, 
19737; Prais, 1976; Hannah, 1983). Much subsequent research into 
diversification has concentrated on comparisons between the performance of 
diversified and non-diversified companies, with generally mixed and 
inconclusive results8.
The particular significance of the multi-divisional structure to the 
present study is the decentralisation of decision making. Divisional 
managers may have considerable autonomy over decisions affecting the 
future of their businesses. Corporate headquarters under the control of 
top management - that small group of executive board members at the top 
of the corporation - are more concerned with company-wide issues and 
restrict their activities to planning, appraisal and control. Barwise 
et al (1987) argue that effective product-market strategies come from 
the divisions, with their detailed understanding of the market and the 
company's competitive position, which top management do not share 
directly9. It is this discrepancy in the knowledge available to 
managers at different levels within the hierarchically structured large 
firm which is at the root of the problem now to be examined.
2.2.3 
Concern with the workings of organisations in general and the management 
of business organisations in particular has led to the establishment of a 
significant area of investigation within social science. Nevertheless,
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although the problem of management of the large firm is now the subject of 
an extensive literature, relatively little attention has been devoted to 
the management of the resource allocation process in particular. What 
work has been done has drawn considerably on research into the more 
general workings and activities of organisations and, more particularly, 
on the relationship between the firm and its environment and on decision 
processes within firms. Before proceeding to a consideration of the 
specific problem of resource allocation, therefore, it is appropriate to 
consider briefly the wider theoretical context within which the problem of 
managing large firms has been examined.
Burrell and Morgan (1979) trace the historic development of organisation 
theory and locate this within the 'functionalist paradigm' of social 
science 10 . They identify a number of interrelated lines of enquiry 
in this development, all of which stem from two approaches at the 
forefront of human relations studies 11 . The first of these is the 
'orthodox' school of management and administration theory, oriented 
towards management concepts, problems and prescriptions, characterised by 
the work of Taylor (1947) and Fayol (1949). The second is the work of the 
early industrial psychologists concerning the behaviour of people in 
organisations (see Lupton, 1971). Although both survive in contemporary 
work, recent advances have been made which are more directly relevant to 
this thesis, in particular those that focus on questions of the goal 
orientation of organisations, decision making process within organisations 
and on the relationship between an organisation and its environment.
Organisation goals and decisions
The significance of these developments to this thesis is that initially 
they challenged more conventional management and economic thinking, 
particularly related to the economic theory of the firm. Orthodox 
economic theory embodies the scientific or rational model of decision 
making which involves the choice of the optimum solution following the 
evaluation of all possibilities. Although considerable challenges to 
corporate maximising behaviour had arisen since the work of Berle and 
Means in 1932 12, the notion of 'administrative man' developed by 
Simon (1945) with an emphasis on the 'satisficing' rather than the
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maximising behaviour of 'economic man' of orthodox economics was 
particularly influential 13 and led to a number of alternative models 
of organisational decision making (see, for example, Allison, 1969; Butler 
et al, 1993). Four key models are reviewed briefly below.
March and Simon (1958) and Simon (1960) proposed a 'bounded-rational' 
model of decision making. March and Simon (1958) argued that the 
complexities of problems facing organisations are of such a magnitude that 
managers seek satisfactory rather than optimum performance, attend 
sequentially to objectives and deploy standard "repertories of action 
programs" to deal with recurring situations 14.
Cyert and March (1963) concentrated on corporate decisions and viewed the 
firm as a grouping of sub-coalitions of individuals which created the 
potential for conflict in the formation of organisational goals. In their 
political model of organisational decision making such conflicts are 
resolved by the sequential rather than the simultaneous attention to 
goals 15 ' 16. These developments showed early theoretical promise and 
attracted the attention of many orthodox - and influential - economists 
(for example, Williamson, 1964, 1971; Machlup 1967; Baumol and Stewart, 
1971). Further, their associated methodologies also suggested new 
approaches to the examination of decision making and management action 
which influenced more mainstream organisation and management research 
(see, for example, Pettigrew, 1973; Hickson et al, 1986).
Other key developments include the 'garbage-can' model of organisational 
decision making (Cohen et al, 1972) - within which decisions are 
frequently made under problematic, uncertain and ambiguous conditions - 
and the contingency model of Thompson and Tuden (1956). This latter model 
considers problems of decision uncertainty and raises the question of the 
relationship between an organisation and its environment.
Organisation and environment
Concern with environmental influences led to an open systems view of the 
firm, typified by Katz and Kahn (1978) whose main concern is with the 
organisation as an energic process of input, throughput and output, rather
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than as a physical structure 17. This model considers that 
organisations are essentially purposive in nature, and are analagous to 
biological organisms 18.
Empirical studies of the influence of environmental factors and technology 
on organisation (for example Burns and Stalker, 1961; Woodward, 
1965) 19 have led to a contingency model of organisation refined by 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). The concepts of differentiation and 
integration introduced by Lawrence and Lorsch to help explain how the 
firms they studied adapted to the instability and uncertainty in their 
environment20 are particularly important for an examination of the 
problem of managing the large divisionalised firm.
As will be seen, the ideas introduced above are important to a 
consideration of investment decision making within large firms. Of course 
the development of organisational research has not been restricted to 
these lines of enquiry (for an overview, see Morgan, 1986). Indeed, 
subsequent work within the contingency framework, for example, has been 
concerned with the design of organisations (Galbraith, 1973, 1977; 
Mintzberg, 1979); behavioural theories have been elaborated within an 
economic analysis (Cyert and Simon, 1983).
There are two main streams of literature concerning corporate capital 
investment. The first is located within the maximising paradigm of 
orthodox economic theory. The second concerns capital investment as a 
social process within large organisations. The latter has arisen largely 
out of attacks on the realism of the former, particularly from the 
behavioural approach to organisational decision making briefly introduced 
above. Conflicts between these paradigms have already been noted in 
chapter 1 above (section 1.2.2) and are reviewed below.
2.3.1 Purpose and process in corporate capital investment
Capital investment is such a fundamental activity to corporate survival 
and growth that it occupies a central position in a number of disciplines,
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most especially in microeconomic theory and in theories of corporate 
finance. These treatments of investment tend to focus on decision rules 
for the maximisation of profit - or another variable21 . Much of the 
economics literature concerned with investment decisions is interested in 
the determinants of investment and the economic conditions under which 
successful investment is possible22.
Within the closely related literature on corporate finance and capital 
budgeting, there is a strong emphasis on the identification and 
development of techniques for the evaluation and appraisal of investment 
options (Merrett and Sykes, 1973; Levy and Sarnat, 1986; Bierman and 
Smidt, 1988). The point here is that as much of this literature embodies 
the rational model of decision making, the characterisation of the 
investment problem within theories of economics and finance is thus as one 
of choice. And the prescriptions for choosing are mainly financial. The 
problem of how investment decisions are actually made receives little 
attention. As Pinches (1982) argues:
"... the fact remains that there is a substantial gulf between what 
financial theory says about capital budgeting decisions and how 
firms actually make these decisions"23 .
2.3.2 Questions from corporate finance
Questions about the process of capital investment from within the corporate 
finance area were initially raised because of concern about the extent to 
which firms actually followed theoretical decision rules. A survey by 
Istvan (1961) found that such techniques were not widely used24. 
Williams and Scott (1965) found that formal evaluation techniques were used 
sparingly and supplemented by considerable managerial judgement in the 14 
firms studied. They wondered whether investment was so complex that 
evaluation of every implication was not possible25 .
Cannon (1968) in an examination of 4 of the 14 firms studied by Williams 
and Scott found that managers believed in their ability to foresee the 
future accurately and relied on unchallenged assertions of product 
demand26. That managers appeared to behave irrationally raised 
questions about the complexity of investment decisions and the social and 
political context within which such decisions were taken (see Berry, 1984).
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2.3.3 Contributions from the corporate strategy area
Bromiley (1986) identified two major trends in the strategic management 
literature relating to corporate capital investment. The first examines 
the process of investment by which individual projects are identified, 
developed, justified and approved and is typified by the work of Aharoni 
(1966) and Bower (1970). The second concerns planning and investment 
systems and, in particular, a contingency approach to corporate planning 
systems (Lorrange, 1972)27. As this thesis is more concerned with 
the former approach, that is with an examination of how capital investment 
decisions come to be made - and implemented - work in the latter area will 
be mentioned only briefly here.
Aharoni (1966) examined corporate decisions to invest in another country 
and described the decision as a process within an organisational context. 
This extended earlier work on investment decision making in large 
corporations (Berg, 1963; Sihler, 1964). Another key work in this 
tradition is that by Bower (1970) who examined investment decisions in 
each of four divisions of a large, diversified US company and 
significantly extended the work of Ackerman (1968), Aharoni, Berg and 
Sihler. Bower's model provides a useful framework within which to address 
the research problems of concern here and will be discussed in greater 
depth in chapter 3 below28. For now, however, it is important 
briefly to acknowledge Bower's distinctive contribution to the literature.
Bower's study highlights the importance of capital investment as a process 
of resource allocation spread over long periods of time and across many 
levels of the corporation. He argued that, unlike the prescriptive 
theories of finance and economics which emphasised the role of top 
management in choosing between investment options, the process as observed 
was more 'bottom-up'. Investment proposals arose from the divisions and 
were developed and attracted support as they progressed through the 
management hierarchy, arriving with top management as ready packaged 
projects which were either accepted (more likely) or rejected, but hardly 
ever changed.
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It is notable that Bower examined capital investment projects which led to 
the acquisition of new production facilities. His analysis owes much to 
the picture of man within organisation developed by Simon (1945) and to 
the political model of organisational decision making outlined by Cyert 
and March (1963). An important element in Bower's model is the activity 
of integration which is necessary to reconcile the needs of divisional 
managers with those of top management and draws heavily on Lawrence and 
Lorsch (1967). These antecedents are considered more fully in chapter 3 
below.
2.3.4 Research into investment decision making in large firms
Early support was provided for Bower's analysis by Ackerman (1970), who 
found that investment projects were not selected by top management on a 
corporate-wide consideration of the project's worth29. Carter 
(1971) examined six corporate planning decisions in a large corporation 
within the Cyert and March behavioural framework and found that decisions 
were made on the basis of 'threshold levels' related to managerial 
competence. These threshold levels were consistent with the bounded 
rationality approach of Simon. Carter argued further that management may 
consider more aspects of proposals involving strategic decisions than in 
the case of operating decisions (the focus of Cyert and March's 
behavioural theory)30.
To cite yet another instance, Mintzberg et al (1976) examined 25 
corporate strategic decision processes in terms of three broad phases of 
identification, development and selection. They note that a critical 
problem in capital investment decision making in large firms is related to 
discrepancies in knowledge available to managers at different levels in 
the firm (see 2.2.2 above):
"...authorizes generally lack the in-depth knowledge that the 
developers of the solution have. In capital budgeting... choices 
are made by people who do not comprehend the proposals presented to 
them. Thus, in authorization, the comparative ignorance of the 
manager is coupled with the inherent bias of the sponsor. This 
explains why empirical studies of capital budgeting have shown it 
to be a somewhat distorted, political process far less analytical 
than the normative literature suggests"31 .
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In the UK, King (1975, 1975a) examined three investment decisions in two 
large companies. He uses the concept of 'disjointed incrementalism' 
(Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963)32 to criticise weaknesses in the 
'scientific model' of decision making applied to actual decisions, and 
questions normative capital budgeting theory as providing useful 
descriptions of the investment decision process as observed. King's model 
divides the process into six stages: triggering, screening, definition 
evaluation, transmission and decision. He attributed the finding that not 
all possible alternatives are evaluated as due to the limited problem 
solving capacity of organisations and individuals. His 'transmission' 
stage is directly comparable to Bower's emphasis on the 'impetus' given to 
projects as they attract support and sponsorship at successively higher 
levels in the corporate hierarchy:
"In a hierarchical organisation the case for investment has to be 
transmitted upwards through the organisation. This will be an 
essentially political process during which the proponents of the 
project seek higher level sponsors."3
Further work in the UK includes that by Berry (1976, 1984) who studied a 
large functionally divisionalised single product firm (electricity 
generation and supply) in the UK public sector. His approach through the 
open socio-technical systems paradigm (in the tradition of Katz and Kahn, 
1978; see 2.3.1 above)34 considered the capital budgeting process as 
"an integrative procedure for top management" in that it linked the 
economic and financial conceptions of top management with the technical 
and product-market conceptions of lower level managers35 . Although 
this resembles the role of integration in Bower's model, Berry argues that 
the open systems approach has allowed management behaviour to be observed 
without having to treat this behaviour as resulting directly from top 
management objectives which, he argues, is necessary in Bower's analysis. 
This critique is returned to in chapter 3 below.
More recently, Marsh et al (1988) have examined major investment 
decisions in each of three large UK companies. Their approach, in the 
tradition of Bower (1970) and King (1975) was to track decisions from 
their origins within the organisation to final approval by top 
management. They found much to support the view of investment as a
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'bottom-up' process involving processes of definition, transmission 
through the organisation and approval in line with Bower (1970), Ackerman 
(1970), King (1975), Mintzberg et al (1976) and Hickson et al 
(1986). In addition, they suggest that top management may manipulate the 
organisational structure in an attempt to influence the behaviour of lower 
level managers in desired directions (Bower, 1970), but consider that top 
management have a more direct role in the investment process than 
acknowledged either by Bower or King36.
The discussion now turns to a consideration of the key issues arising from 
empirical studies of the process of capital investment decision making.
2.3.5 Summary of key issues
Firstly, most of these studies highlight the importance of capital 
investment as a process, often occurring over quite lengthy periods of 
time and involving different levels within the corporation (Williams and 
Scott, 1965; Berg, 1963; Sihler, 1964; Aharoni, 1966; Ackerman, 1968, 
1970; Bower, 1970; Carter, 1971; King, 1975, 1975a; Mintzberg, et al, 
1976, Berry, 1976, 1984; Bromiley, 1986; Marsh et al, 1988). Bower 
(1970), King (1975) and Pinches (1982) in particular argue that the 
traditional emphasis in capital finance theory on the role of top 
management in the final 'decision' stage is misplaced.
Secondly, capital investment decisions in large corporations are observed 
as a 'bottom-up' process, where proposals which arise from within the 
divisions are transmitted up the management hierarchy before approval by 
top management. Although the extent to which top management participate 
in this process was observed to vary, generally top management's role is, 
as Chandler (1962) observed, more concerned with planning and control than 
with operational matters37. An additional and important point is 
that this bottom up process is characterised by the political nature of 
sponsorship/transmission. Sponsorship involves the commitment of managers 
who must believe in the value to them of supporting the investment 
proposal; managers lower down the hierarchy must secure the support of 
those higher up if their proposal is to stand a chance of success (Berg, 
1963; Aharoni, 1964; Ackerman, 1968, 1970; Bower, 1970; Carter, 1971; King 
1975; Hickson etal, 1986; Marsh etal, 1988).
Thirdly, the process takes place within an organisational structure and 
within a wider environment. The formal organisational structure, ie the 
systems of information transmission, control, performance measurement and 
reward can influence the investment process, particularly the kind of 
projects that are identified for proposal to top management (Carter, 1971; 
King 1975). Although a theory relating particular behaviour to precise 
organisational forms has long been a goal for research38, Bower 
(1970) in particular argues that organisational structure or context can 
be manipulated by top management to influence the behaviour of lower level 
managers who are involved more directly in the resource allocation 
process. This is given some, though by no means conclusive support by 
Marsh et al (1988), who argue that tracking a single investment in 
each of three companies gives limited data for investigating the influence 
of structure, and that structure is designed on a wider set of 
considerations than encountered on any narrow consideration of investment 
decision making39.
Finally, descriptive models of the corporate investment process have been 
outlined which, while different in detail, confirm the process as 
comprising a number of phases or sub-processes covering project 
identification, transmission across the hierarchy and approval (Aharoni, 
1966; Bower, 1970; Ackerman, 1970; King, 1975; Mintzberg et al, 
1976).
2.3.6 The importance of process and the role of implementation
The studies reviewed above portray a radically different picture of 
capital investment from that contained within the corporate finance and 
economics literature. However, the thrust of the argument developed below 
is not against the descriptive accuracy of normative finance and economics 
theory, for such theory does not claim to describe the actual decision 
processes of individual firms40. The argument seeks instead to 
emphasise and describe corporate capital investment as a process of 
decision making - rather than a single decision - leading to the 
acquisition of new factory buildings. Whether investment outcomes 
approximate to the maximising behaviour of orthodox economics is of little 
concern here.
Indeed, the empirical studies of the capital investment process reported 
above may be criticised for their lack of emphasis on the financial and 
economic aspects of investment. Few studies have focused on both process 
and financial or economic analysis. Recent work has attempted to redress 
this shortcoming, most notably by Bromiley (1986) who examines corporate 
planning behaviour and uses the resulting empirical observations to 
generate quantitative econometric models41 in the tradition of Baumol 
and Stewart (1971). In that Bromiley's concern is with the economic 
determinants of investment and his focus is on aggregate investment 
planning in line with the work of Lorrange (1972, 1979) rather than on 
individual projects in the tradition of Bower (1970), King (1975) and Marsh 
et al (1988), his work is less directly relevant to this thesis. 
However, Bromiley found a number of similarities between the four firms he 
examined and the firm examined by Bower and he also observed that 
investment decision making was a 'bottom-up' process42.
The empirical studies and analyses which view corporate capital investment 
as a process of bargaining and choice, spread across many levels of the 
firm and over long periods of time,43 are relatively few in number. 
However, they raise important questions of how the corporate client of the 
construction industry obtains a suitable new building. In order to bring 
these questions, and, specifically, their implications for construction 
into sharper focus for research, the discussion now turns to how corporate 
clients are portrayed within the construction procurement and management 
literature. Prior to this, however, it is important to consider the 
treatment of project implementation in the literature reviewed up to now. 
In almost all of the studies examined here, the capital investment process 
was considered to be concluded with the authorisation of investment funding 
by top management. In the few cases where implementation was considered, 
the financial outcome of the project was the main focus (Williams and 
Scott, 1965; Cannon, 1968). The key work reviewed above adopted a 
longitudinal, case-based approach which tracked decisions only up to top 
management approval (Bower, 1970; King, 1975; Marsh et al, 1988), with 
little interest in either the process or outcome of project 
implementation. Indeed, in some cases the work was written up before the 
investment projects examined had been implemented (Marsh et al, 1988).
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Bower (1970) considers implementation in terms of the practicality of 
effecting strategic choices, ie the choice of organisation structure to 
enable strategic objectives to be achieved44. There is no 
consideration of the implementation of individual investment projects as 
involving the procurement of building work spread over time. For a 
consideration of the client's role in implementing capital investment 
projects therefore, attention must now be directed to the literature on 
building procurement and management.
2.4 IMPLEMENTATION AS A CONSTRUCTION PROCESS
2.4.1 Introduction and recent developments
The literature on construction procurement and management is now 
extensive. In recent years a considerable amount of research attention 
has been devoted to the study of project management, in line with the rise 
to prominence of project management as a distinct professional discipline 
within the UK construction industry (Bennett, 1991; Royal Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors, 1991; Smith and Morris, 1992). The proliferation of 
building procurement methods since the early 1980s in particular has 
provided considerable scope for enquiry (Harris and McCaffer, 1989).
Additionally, there has been renewed interest in the operation and 
management of the construction firm (Hillebrandt and Cannon, 1989, 1990; 
Newcombe et at, 1990, 1990a). Recent developments in strategic 
management (eg Porter, 1980, 1985, 1990) have helped continue the interest 
in the construction firm from a corporate strategy perspective (Langford 
and Male, 1991; Male and Stocks, 1991; Betts and Ofori, 1992). Despite 
this plethora of research activity, there has been relatively little 
interest in the role of building clients in general and corporate clients 
in particular.
2.4.2 The focus of construction research and the client role
The process of building design and construction within functional, 
temporal, monetary, institutional, statutory and aesthetic constraints and 
considerations is a complex one (Stone 1983). If the concerns of
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construction research have focused primarily on construction problems, it 
may be argued that the idiosyncratic nature of the building process has 
provided more than sufficient scope for enquiry. In spite of this, the 
building process remains susceptible to problems of delay, cost escalation 
and product quality45 .
While it is not the intention to catalogue these problems here, a brief 
review is instructive for an examination of the client's role. Concern in 
the early 1960s with construction industry practice and performance 
(Emmerson, 1962; Banwell, 1964) prompted a range of studies - particularly 
at the Tavistock Institute - which initially associated problems with 
interrelationships and communication between the participants in the 
construction process, including the client (Higgin and Jessop, 1965; 
Crichton, 1966, Bryant et al, 1969). These studies explicitly 
recognised that construction clients were frequently large organisational 
'systems' which had to be considered separately from the construction 
process. Higgin et al (1965) argued that clients were often "complex 
systems of competing interests" which the building industry needed to take 
into account:
"We have the impression that in its relationships with its client 
systems, the building industry not only does not take sufficient 
account of the complexity of the organisations it is dealing with, 
but tends to be impatient of this complexity."46
Despite this early recognition of the client as an organisation and the 
interest in the client's role on construction projects, much work since 
has paid little attention to these ideas. This point is returned to in 
more detail in section 2.4.3 below.
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s a series of reports by the National 
Economic Development Office focused on more specific problems in the 
industrial and engineering sectors of construction (National Economic 
Development Office, 1970, 1976, 1976a, 1978, 1983). This focus upon the 
industrial building sector is particularly important to the present study 
and arose partly from the UK Government's industrial strategy and concern 
about the implications for construction of an expected policy shift toward 
the regeneration of manufacturing industry47. It also arose from
unfavourable comparisons between the performance of UK and foreign 
construction industries (Wilson, 1969; and especially Slough Estates, 
1976, 1979), particularly as regards construction times48. National 
Economic Development Office (1983) reports in considerable detail a 
questionnaire survey and 56 case studies of factory building projects (35 
of which were purpose built for clients' own uses). Although the client 
role is examined, there is little detail provided on the internal process 
of decision making within the client organisation. The focus is 
restricted to client attitudes towards - and aspects of the project 
affecting - the duration of the construction process49.
During the 1980s the focus of enquiry within construction related research 
shifted more towards different forms of procurement and management. This 
arose partly from increasing criticism of, and decline in 'traditional' 
procurement practices (Chartered Institute of Building, 1988), and partly 
from changes in the strategic positioning of construction firms keen to 
offer differentiated management services (Hillebrandt and Cannon, 
199050).
Indeed, client criticism has at times been forthright and directed at the 
overall performance of construction in general with particular emphasis on 
management to time and cost criteria (Royal Institution of Chartered 
Surveyors, 1982; British Property Federation, 1983). However, much of 
this criticism has tended to argue from the point of view of those 
developer-clients whose interest is in buildings as income generating 
goods rather than production goods51 (Slough Estates, 1976, 1979; 
British Property Federation, 1983). While the developer-client 
perspective addresses important concerns, it tends to miss aspects of the 
corporate capital investment process that are particularly important for 
the present study.
First, developers are likely to be smaller organisations than the large 
manufacturing firms of concern to this study52. Secondly, unlike 
manufacturing firms building new factories for their own use, speculative 
developers are not concerned with the building as a factor of production 
in their own business. Thirdly, developers who do not build for their own 
use will not normally need to reconcile the accommodation needs of
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potentially conflicting internal departments. Fourthly, the business of 
property development includes the regular procurement of building work. 
It has already been noted that manufacturing firms tend to invest 
reluctantly and infrequently in new buildings (section 1.3.3). What may 
be a routine decision for a developer may be a major one for a 
manufacturer. Finally, developers generally provide relatively small 
standardised factories to suit a notional client's accommodation 
requirements (Centre for Advanced Land Use Studies, 1979, 1984). 
Fothergil et al (1987) argue that the emphasis given to the 
development-for-sale scenario in the literature on industrial property and 
buildings has tended to bias this literature towards consideration of the 
needs of small firms53.
2.4.3 The corporate client within the construction literature
The argument being developed is that despite considerable research 
activity - some of which has been motivated by client criticism - the 
characterisation of the client within the construction procurement and 
management literature has not altered radically from the perception of a 
unitary and decisive entity which the Tavistock Studies in part sought to 
dispel (Higgin and Jessop, 1965; Higgin et al, 1965). Further, this 
literature tends to ignore the important corporate investment process by 
which decisions about building needs are made.
The two problems raised in chapter 1 (section 1.1.2) provide a focus for 
the examination of how the corporate client is portrayed within the 
construction procurement and management literature. The first of these 
problems concerns how the firm may manage the involvement of the 
construction industry in the firm's capital investment decisions. The 
second concerns the firm's role during the process of construction to 
ensure that the building finally obtained is suitable. To examine what 
the literature has to say about these problems, the role of the client in 
briefing, procurement and construction management will each be reviewed.
Briefing and the client
The models and descriptions of capital investment decision making 
discussed in section 2.3.4 above include a process or phase of 'project
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definition'. This includes the briefing process54 whereby the 
firm's building requirements are identified and translated into design 
proposals, at least to the extent which would allow the feasibility of the 
resulting scheme to be established. Construction designers in particular 
have considered this briefing to be of great importance to subsequent 
design development and construction work (Newman et at, 1981); many 
problems associated with the building process are frequently thought to 
originate in inadequate briefing (Mackinder and Marvin, 1982). Indeed, so 
important is briefing perceived to be that there is much guidance 
currently available on the conduct of adequate briefing (Ministry of 
Public Buildings and Works, 1965; National Joint Consultative Council, 
1973; National Economic Development Office, 1974, 1985; Chartered 
Institute of Building, 1980; O'Reilly, 1987; Building Services Research 
and Information Association, 1990). Similarly, a good deal of the 
construction procurement and management literature stresses the importance 
of briefing (eg Ashworth, 1986; Walker, 1989).
However, such guidance tends to be written from a construction industry 
perspective and considers the problem as one of building design (Newman 
et at, 1981; Salisbury, 1990; Kelly et al, 1992)55. 
Further, it often pays little attention to the process by which investment 
decisions are made - and within which projects, and building needs, get 
defined. Indeed, the client within the briefing literature is largely 
unitary, decisive, clear and capable - with professional help - of 
articulating building requirements to the construction industry (Goodacre 
et al, 1982). Briefing guidance which recognises corporate or 
organisational clients tends to require that these clients be represented 
by an authoritative and decisive individual (National Joint Consultative 
Council, 1973; Chartered Institute of Building, 1980; National Economic 
Development Office, 1985; O'Reilly, 1987; Building Services Research and 
Information Association, 1990) or an equally authoritative 'decision 
making unit' (Kelly et al, 1992).
Although such prescriptions are intended primarily to help the building 
design and subsequent construction activities, they may also help 
clients. By emphasising the need for a clear and unambiguous statement of
building needs they require clients to think hard about their requirements 
(Goodacre et al, 1982). Seen from another perspective, however, some 
of the construction industry's 'impatience' with client organisational 
complexity argued by Higgin et al (1965) and Cherns and Bryant (1984) 
is discernible. Little consideration is given in the briefing literature 
to the extent to which the client organisation may be capable of being 
represented by a single decisive voice.
More importantly for the present study the capital investment context 
within which clients' decisions on building requirements are made is 
largely left out of the construction briefing literature. In particular, 
there is little or no recognition of the process of investment decision 
making spread across levels of the corporate client's organisational 
hierarchy and over long periods of time charted by, for example, Bower 
(1970), King (1975), Marsh et al (1988). Further, in its emphasis on 
a single authoritative voice, the briefing literature ignores the 
essentially 'bottom-up' nature of the corporate capital investment 
process, where proposals and detailed requirements come from within the 
divisions of large organisations rather than from top management.
In summary, the role of the corporate client within the briefing 
literature is as a largely unitary and decisive entity from which 
information on building needs is elicited by building designers. Finally, 
briefing is seen as a building design problem; there is no consideration 
of how the corporate client may manage and use the contribution of the 
construction industry at an early stage in preparing and progressing 
investment proposals. This point is returned to in section 2.5 below.
Procurement and the client
Much attention has been directed at the match between client type and 
needs, project type and procurement method56. As yet no theory of 
construction procurement has emerged to enable the choice of method to be 
related to the client's characteristics or building needs. Rather, such 
choice is seen as an 'expert' decision (Langford et al, 1987; Brandon 
et al, 1988; Kelly et al, 1992) involving a considerable degree of
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subjective professional judgement and discretion. Indeed, the debate on 
choice of procurement method has elements of a factional struggle between 
proponents of different systems with little sign of resolution (Centre for 
Strategic Studies in Construction, 1991).
The concern here, however, is with the treatment of the corporate client 
within the procurement literature and, more particularly, with how the 
client ensures that a suitable building is eventually obtained. A number 
of procurement guides focus specifically on new industrial buildings 
(Chartered Institute of Building, 1980; Royal Institution of Chartered 
Surveyors, 1981; Department of the Environment and Department of Industry, 
1982; National Economic Development Office, 1983). Within these, clients 
are generally considered in terms of their need for speed of construction, 
for certainty of time and cost, for flexibility to change during the 
construction process and for technological complexity. The emphasis 
within this literature - and in the more general procurement literature 
(Harris and MacCaffer, 1989; Franks, 1990) - is on matching contractual 
arrangements to these criteria. The extent to which the client's 
organisational characteristics and decision processes influence the choice 
of procurement method is not generally considered. Nahapiet and Nahapiet 
(1985, 1985a) support the contingency approach outlined above. Although 
they argue that contract selection depends on client attributes, they are 
more concerned with the level of construction expertise available in-house 
(see also Stocks and Male, 1983; Bryman et al, 1988) rather than the 
client's organisational characteristics or decision processes per 
se51.
The extent to which clients expect their requirements to change during the 
construction process would appear to have a more powerful effect on the 
choice of procurement method (Ireland, 1985; National Economic Development 
Office, 1985). In general, management or negotiated-type approaches tend 
to be favoured where the expectation of change during the construction 
process is high (for example, Department of the Environment and Department 
of Industry, 1982; Nahapiet and Nahapiet, 1985; Skitmore and Marsden, 
1988).
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This is supported in guidance available from the public sector client's 
perspective (HM Treasury, 1992a). Within this literature, however, the 
problem for the client is not how to organise the construction process 
toobtain the building required. Rather, it is portrayed as a problem of 
choice - with expert advice - from a menu of more or less standard 
approaches. Further, there is concern that the need for flexibility 
during construction will lead to cost and time penalties and is therefore 
widely discouraged (Chartered Institute of Building, 1980; Department of 
the Environment and Department of Industry, 1982; National Economic 
Development Office 1983,1985).
Construction management and the client
The available literature on construction management58 is extensive 
and it is not the intention to provide a detailed review in this thesis. 
Rather, the focus is on construction as a process of implementing a 
corporate capital investment decision. Particular attention will be paid 
to the role of the corporate client in obtaining a suitable building in 
conditions of uncertainty.
Cherns and Bryant (1984) provide a reminder that in almost two decades 
since the Tavistock Studies, relatively little attention has been paid in 
the construction literature to the client as a complex organisation. They 
raise 20 propositions for research concerning the client's role in 
construction management. These include the importance of the complexity 
of the client's organisation to how the construction process is managed, 
and the industry's impatience with this complexity. They argue further 
that only a close, in-depth study of the client's organisation can begin 
to address these issues59.
A good deal of research into construction management generally has focused 
on the form of project organisation, what Cherns and Bryant term the 
'temporary multiorganization'(TMO)60. As with the choice of 
procurement method, there is much debate as to the appropriate form of 
project organisation structure and, while there is general agreement on a
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contingency approach (Morris and Hough, 1987; Walker, 1989), there is less 
agreement on the particular choice of project form.
Morris (1973, 1982) argues that appropriate project organisation forms are 
dependent to a large extent on project characteristics of scale, 
complexity and urgency in particular; Morris and Hough (1987) add that the 
organisations sponsoring and building a project are also important61 . 
Walker (1989) considers the extent of client expertise in project 
management or construction to be an important determinant of project 
organisation62.
The role of the client has been receiving increasing attention in recent 
years (Department of Construction Management, 1989). Laufer (1990) for 
example, considers the process of capital project planning from the client 
viewpoint, arguing that the client's role in planning depends, inter 
alia, on the type of industry. This work was extended in Laufer (1992) 
where additional variables were identified as affecting client involvement 
in project planning, including the type of facility under construction and 
type of contract. Male and Kelly (1989) and Kelly and Male (1991) focus 
on an assessment of clients' 'needs' using structured functional analysis 
procedures within a value management framework. Bresnen and Haslam (1991) 
in a survey of 138 clients suggest that clients' choices of project 
management approach may be as much influenced by internal factors and 
familiarity than project-specific demands (see also Bryman et al,
1988). Despite this, however, the dominant theme in the literature 
concerns the overall management and leadership of project organisations. 
And much of the mainstream project management literature places this in 
the hands of professional project managers. Within the resulting 
frameworks - either functional, project or matrix63 - the client's 
role is one of providing information and approving decisions. In this, 
clients have much in common with their counterparts in the briefing and 
procurement literatures: they are required to act as unitary entities, to 
be authoritative, decisive and certain of their requirements (O'Neill,
1989).
Some of the guidance on the management of construction projects emanating 
from client bodies reaches similar conclusions, particularly where the
concern is with management to time and cost criteria. Recent developments 
within the UK public sector, for example, have focused on the control of 
public expenditure on capital projects. Following the 'Ibbs Report' of 
1985 (HM Treasury, 1985), subsequent work (HM Treasury, 1986) recommended 
that government departments as project 'owners' and construction clients 
be represented by a senior and authoritative 'project sponsor' who would 
procure separate project management services. This separation of the role 
of client and manager is further underlined by a series of client guidance 
notes from HM Treasury's Central Unit on Purchasing (for example, HM 
Treasury, 1989, 1992, 1992a). The framework recommended places the 
project sponsor in a similar role to that of the client representative in 
much of the mainstream project management literature.
Another document claiming to argue from the client's perspective is the 
European Construction Institute (1991) which provides similar guidance on 
the authority, decisiveness and certainty required of the client role to 
that found in the mainstream briefing and project management literature.
While all of this guidance emphasises the need for management to cost and 
time criteria in particular, the public sector material must also be seen 
in the light of the UK Government's reappraisal of the role of government 
on public capital projects from that of provider to that of 
sponsor64. And although generally prescriptive, all of this 
material builds to a considerable body of argument about the management of 
construction projects and the client role.
It is not the intention here to be dismissive of this guidance. Rather, 
given the evidence available from empirical studies of the capital 
investment process within large organisations, questions may be asked 
about the emphasis on the unitary decisive client. In particular, the 
ways in which the client may implement a capital investment decision in 
circumstances where building needs may change in the short term is not at 
all clear. Although Gardiner and Simmons (1992) suggest that in terms of 
project organisations, problems which arise from project change are 
indicative of a systemic failure (ie it is not the change which is the 
problem, but the failure of the system to accommodate it), much of the
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guidance reviewed above counsels against major change during the process 
of construction (Walker, 1989; European Construction Institute, 1991; HM 
Treasury, 1992). More than that, structures and procedures which 
concentrate on time and cost criteria say little about how changed client 
circumstances are accommodated.
Walker (1989) attempts to address these problems. He devotes considerable 
attention to the client and the need to integrate the client's 
organisation with the project organisation. Indeed, his treatment of 
clients has been revised and updated since Walker (1984) to take account 
of Alien (1984), Cherns and Bryant (1984) and the Slough Estates' (1976) 
criticisms of UK construction performance in particular. Although the 
corporate organisation is viewed as an open-adaptive system in the 
tradition of Katz and Kahn (1978) with potentially conflicting internal 
objectives, there is an emphasis on the top management level as having 
authority for construction decisions65. Additionally, many of the 
prescriptive elements of the briefing literature outlined above - which 
emphasise the single authoritative voice - are re-echoed in Walker's 
prescriptions for the client representative role during the construction 
process66.
A mechanism by which clients can incorporate changed requirements is 
outlined by Walker and involves the identification of key decision points 
by clients who expect their requirements to change. Opportunities for 
review are therefore provided; changes are made if feedback from the 
project or the environment indicates that these are required67. 
Whether project organisations contain such a mechanism is a question for 
research; indeed, Walker argues that the brief could provide the basis for 
this, but wonders whether normal briefs are adequate. The question of 
unanticipated change arising outside of the decision point/feedback 
mechanism is not considered but perhaps needs to be. Questions for 
research will now be addressed following a short summary of key issues 
arising from the review of the corporate client's role on construction 
projects presented thus far.
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2.4.4 Summary of key issues
Problems with the construction process, together with attempts by 
construction contractors and consultants to offer differentiated 
construction and management services have motivated a largely prescriptive 
line of enquiry in the construction procurement and management 
literature. Further, the solutions offered tend to be concerned with 
choice of procurement or management method, where the focus on management 
to time and cost (and, latterly, 'quality*68) criteria 
predominates. Within this literature the corporate client per se 
receives no special attention.
First, a good deal of the literature on briefing, construction procurement 
and management consider the client as a unitary entity. Secondly, while 
much of the literature acknowledges the existence of client organisations 
(for example, Department of the Environment and Department of Industry, 
1982; National Economic Development Office, 1983, 1985; O'Reilly, 1987; 
Walker, 1989), there is an emphasis that such organisations be represented 
by a single, decisive, authoritative voice. The dominant picture of the 
corporate client which emerges from the construction literature is of the 
single-minded sole entrepreneur of traditional economic theory69.
Thirdly, the client representative is considered capable of speaking on 
behalf of the client organisation and of identifying clearly the 
organisation's building requirements. Fourthly, there is considerable 
emphasis within the literature that such requirements be stated with as 
much certainty as is possible early in the construction process. Change 
to projects during the process of construction is generally discouraged 
(for example, National Economic Development Office, 1985; Walker, 1989; 
European Construction Institute, 1991; HM Treasury, 1992).
Finally, while the construction literature has attempted to take account 
of the corporate client as an organisation, it pays little attention to 
the origins of the building project as arising from a capital investment 
decision. Similarly, the process by which investment decisions -
including decisions about building needs - are made receives little 
attention. The extent to which the construction industry may become 
involved in or contribute to these decisions is largely ignored.
The foregoing review has elaborated the conflict of paradigms relating to 
corporate capital investment outlined in chapter 1. Investigations into 
the way in which large firms make capital investment decisions have posed 
a direct challenge to the portrayal of the investment process in 
prescriptive theories of economic choice. However, such a challenge has 
not yet found its way into the construction literature. In particular, 
the characterisation of the corporate client in much of the construction 
procurement and management literature is as a unitary and decisive 
entity. The corporate client's decision process thus implied is at odds 
with empirical studies of the process by which large firms make decisions 
to invest in new buildings.
2.5.1 Construction involvement in investment decisions
While the discussion has helped clarify the problems for the firm's 
management raised in chapter 1, they remain unresolved. The first of 
these, concerning construction's participation in the investment decision 
prior to project approval, is not addressed in the literature on corporate 
capital investment decision making. The review of this literature, 
however, raises further questions about how the firm may manage 
construction's involvement in the decision process. For if investment 
within the large firm is characterised by a largely political process of 
'impetus' (Bower, 1970) or 'transmission' (King, 1975) whereby projects 
are moved towards funding, the question then arises as to construction's 
role in this. Put another way, how can investment project promoters and 
sponsors use the plans, programmes, estimates etc provided by the 
construction industry to influence the outcome of the capital investment 
decision process?
The literature on construction briefing and procurement, with its emphasis 
on the unitary decisive client and on procurement choices available, also
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lacks a focus on the large corporate client to enable this question to be 
addressed as a problem for the firm's management.
2.5.2 Construction as an investment process
The second problem raised in chapter 1 concerns how the firm's management, 
as construction client, can ensure that a suitable building is obtained. 
Within the literature on capital investment decision making, 
implementation is a largely instantaneous activity. This - presumably - 
involves procuring a building of the scope and within the expenditure 
limit defined in the investment project proposals which have been approved 
by top management. What happens if this definition needs to change during 
the implementation process is a wide open question.
The construction procurement and management literature accepts that 
client's needs may change and indeed offers ways to accommodate this (see 
for example, Walker, 1989). Firstly, however, procurement and management 
procedures as have been developed lay great stress on management to time 
and cost criteria, and generally discourage change - especially major 
change - during the construction process. Secondly, and more importantly 
for the present study, construction tends to be viewed as the end result 
of a decision to invest. Consequently, implementation is a largely 
technical, construction management problem; the client's role is as 
provider of information and as authoriser of decisions.
Seen from the corporate client's perspective and, in particular in the 
context of changing the nature or scope of the building being procured 
during the construction process, a rather different picture emerges. 
Indeed, the process by which the firm's management may identify changes in 
requirements, measure these against the building being procured, seek 
support and authorisation for any additional capital expenditure and 
ensure that necessary changes are made, may all be viewed in terms of a 
process of capital investment as described by, for example, Bower (1970), 
King (1975) and Marsh et al (1988). Seen in this way, implementation 
is more a continuation of the process of capital investment rather than an 
end result of it.
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2.5.3 Research questions
This argument is of central importance and is developed further in chapter 
3 below. It will be argued there and in chapter 4 that both problems may 
be addressed by examining management action during the process of making 
and implementing capital investment decisions in the large manufacturing 
firm. Consideration of the research problems thus far suggests that the 
field investigation needs to consider the following questions:
1. How does the large manufacturing firm make decisions to invest 
in a new industrial building for its own use as a production 
facility?
2. What is the role of the construction industry in this process? 
In particular, how does the firm manage construction's 
contribution?
3. What is the firm's role in the implementation of that part of 
the investment decision involving the procurement of a new 
industrial building?
4. How does the firm ensure that it gets the new industrial 
building it needs? In particular, how is change to project 
definition incorporated during the implementation process?
The model of resource allocation by Bower (1970) provides an appropriate 
and useful framework for an examination of how the firm's management deal 
with the problems raised as part of the resource allocation process. 
This model will now be examined in detail.
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2.6 FOOTNOTES
1 Marsh etal (1988), p3.
2 Hannah (1983), p!52.
3 Davies et al (1991) examined data for the top 5 market leaders 
in some 95 per cent of UK manufacturing industry between 1979 and 
1986. On average only 1 of the top 5 did not survive in the top 5 
over the period and the distribution of rankings and sales among 
the survivors did not change considerably (p3).
4 The number of UK industrial and commercial acquisitions more than 
doubled between 1985 and 1989, and the total value increased more 
than three-fold over the period; Central Statistics Office, 
Business Monitor MQ7 2nd Quarter 1990, Table 1, p2.
5 Hannah (1983), p!56.
6 The corporation', in Galbraith (1967), pp72-85.
7 Channon found that by 1970 some 60 per cent of the largest 100 
British manufacturing firms were relatively highly diversified, and 
some 70 per cent had a multi-divisional structure, compared to 24 
per cent and 8 per cent respectively in 1950; (1973, chapter 3).
8 For a general summary, see Goold and Campbell (1987), p!6. For a 
more detailed review, including a survey of British manufacturing 
industry, see Grant, Jamine and Toker (1986) and Grant, Jamine and 
Thomas (1986).
9 Barwise et al (1987), ppl-2.
10 Burrell and Morgan (1979), pp21-35; four paradigms of social 
science are identified: functionalist, interpretive, radical 
humanist and radical structuralist. Work in the functionalist 
paradigm approaches sociological problems from a positivist 
perspective which attempts to apply the models and methods of the 
natural sciences to studies of human affairs.
11 Burrell and Morgan (1979), chapter 5.
12 For a summary, see Machlup (1967), Loasby (1971).
13 Simon sought to reconcile the rational aspects of human choice of 
interest to economists with the decision making behaviour of 
interest to psychologists and as observed. The concept of 'bounded 
rationality' - where decision making was 'rational' but bounded by 
limits on knowledge - was particularly important here (1976, 3rd 
ed, pp38-41).
14 March and Simon (1958), p!69.
15 Cyert and March (1963), pp35-6,117-8.
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16 Cyert and March are also concerned with the relationship between 
the firm and its environment. They pay particular attention to the 
extent to which firms develop and adopt standard operating 
procedures in an attempt to control their environment and make it 
highly predictable (1963, ppll8-120).
17 Katz and Kahn (1978), pp23-4. Burrell and Morgan argue that the 
theoretical conceptions of open systems theory with its emphasis on 
the largely intangible elements of structure have been difficult to 
examine empirically; such work tends to fall back on the more 
static and definable structural parts (1979, p!60).
18 See Morgan (1986), chapter 3. Morgan considers 7 other 'metaphors' 
for the reading and analysis of organisations: machines, brains, 
cultures, political systems, psychic prisons, instruments of flux 
and transformation and instruments of domination.
19 Burns and Stalker examined how organisation and management changed 
with changes in technology and environment in a study of 20 firms 
(1961). Woodward found a relationship between technology and 
structure in a study of 100 firms (1965).
20 Lawrence and Lorsch argue that as systems grow they become 
differentiated (ie divided into parts each of which deal with 
specific aspects of the environment). The system as a whole 
requires to be integrated if it is to function and adapt to the 
circumstances in the environment. They conclude that business 
success is contingent upon achieving degrees of differentiation and 
integration compatible with the demands of the environment (1967), 
pp6-13.
21 In the long history of the theory of the firm, a variety of 
maximands - including profit - have been proposed; eg managerial 
utility (Williamson, 1964, 1971), sales (Baumol, 1967), growth 
(Marris, 1964, 1971).
22 For an overview, see Bromiley (1986),pp6-7.
23 Pinches (1982), p!5.
24 A series of surveys during the 1970s and early 1980s appear to 
attest to the increasing acceptance of formal evaluation techniques 
(eg Klammer, 1972; Schall, et al, 1978; Scapens and Sale, 
1981). More recently, however, Pike found that the more 
sophisticated techniques of risk analysis and management science 
tended to be used only in the larger firms (1983, pp206-7); 
Mclntyre and Coulthurst found that medium sized UK companies relied 
heavily on simple evaluation techniques of payback (1985, pp53-4).
25 Williams and Scott (1965), pp95-7.
26 Cannon (1968), p!93.
27 Bromiley (1986), pp8-9.
28 For an overview of the model, see chapter 3, section 3.2.1.
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29 Ackerman (1970), p351.
30 Carter (1971), p426.
31 Mintzberg, et al (1976), p260.
32 Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) argue that decisions tend to be 
incremental; decision makers tend to make small incremental changes 
in response to immediate pressures rather than formulating clear 
policy goals, pi 13.
33 King (1975), p77.
34 For a discussion of the open socio-technical systems paradigm, see 
Burrell and Morgan (1979), pp!54-9.
35 Berry (1984), pp78-9.
36 Marsh et al (1988), pp57-9.
37 Chandler (1962), p309.
38 See, for example, Galbraith (1973,1977).
39 Marsh et al (1988), pp45-8 and 60.
40 For a defence of neoclassical microeconomic theory in these terms, 
see, for example, Machlup (1967), pp2-4.
41 Bromiley (1986), pp3-5.
42 Bromiley (1986), p!58. Bromiley's key finding is that investment 
is determined by sales and income; p!54.
43 For a summary, see Marsh et al (1988).
44 Bower (1970), pp286-7.
45 See, for example, Bresnen (1991), p248, who wonders whether the 
root of problems lies in the way in which project aims and 
management procedures are formulated initially.
46 Higgin et al (1965), p33.
47 National Economic Development Office (1978), p2.
48 Natonal Economic Development Office (1983) in particular, with its 
focus on the time taken to procure new industrial buildings in the 
UK, may be seen as a direct response to Slough Estates (1976, 1979) 
which suggested that the industrial building process was lengthier 
and more problematic in the UK than in many of the UK's major 
international competitors.
49 National Economic Development Office (1983), Chapter 9.
50 Hillebrandt and Cannon (1990), pp24-7.
51 Recall the distinction in section 1.2.4 above, and see footnote 12 
to chapter 1.
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52 In the Times 1000 for 1991/92, they were only 2 companies in the 
top 250 UK companies for which property was listed as a main 
activity.
53 Fothergil et al (1987) argue that most speculative industrial 
development is in units of less than 2,500 sq.m. which are more 
suited to small firms who traditionally look to rented 
accommodation to provide their building needs (chapter 3 and 
pp56-61; see also Department of the Environment, 1986).
54 Kelly et al (1992) note that the terms 'brief and 'briefing' 
refer generally to
"the ongoing process of eliciting and documenting the 
requirements of clients at various stages during the design of 
a building project" (pi).
55 Newman et al (1981) and Salisbury (1990) consider briefing as 
an architectural function; Kelly et al (1992) provide a review 
of briefing in the context of models of the design process and from 
a building design perspective, pp5-12.
56 Although the term 'procurement' is used generally to mean the 
process by which a building is obtained, in this section it refers 
to the formal contractual and organisational methods used to 
procure a new building.
57 Nahapiet and Nahapiet (1985a), p225.
58 Construction management is used here as a generic term referring to 
the management of the building design and construction process.
59 Cherns and Bryant (1984), pp 179-183.
60 Cherns and Bryant (1984), pl80-l. Eccles (1981) uses the concept 
of the 'quasi-firm' to describe the organisation of contractors and 
sub-contractors at the core of a building project.
61 Morris and Hough (1987), p239.
62 Walker (1989), chapter 9, table 9.1.
63 Morris and Hough identify three generic forms of project 
organisation: functional, project and matrix (1987, pp238-240. For 
a review, see Bresnen (1990), pp51-67.
64 HM Treasury (1986), pp!6-20.
65 Walker (1989), pp65-7.
66 Walker (1989), pp71-7, and pp!34-141.
67 Walker (1989), pp57-60, and ppl!3-115. See also British Property 
Federation (1983).
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3.1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
This chapter describes Bower's (1970) process model which has been used to 
study management action during capital investment decision making and 
implementation. It begins with an overview of the model introduced in 
chapter 2 and proceeds to a critique including a discussion of the model's 
significance to the present study. Thereafter the discussion concentrates 
on some of the implications for an examination of the research problems in 
terms of the model, and concludes with propositions for research.
3.2 THE RESEARCH MODEL
3.2.1 Overview and recent developments
Bower (1970) examined four separate investment projects in a large 
diversified firm in the USA. The model derived from this investigation 
describes the resource allocation process in terms of three sub-processes: 
definition, impetus, and determination of context. Each of these 
processes can be broken down into three distinct phases: initiating, 
integrating, and corporate; each of which occur at different hierarchical 
levels in the corporation. The model is illustrated diagrammatically at 
Figure 3.1 below. Its processes and phases are described in detail in the 
following sections.
The significance of Bower's model to the present study stems in part from 
its multi-layered description of the investment process wherein investment 
is described in terms of the activities undertaken, the sequence of events 
and the level of hierarchy involved. Further, it depicts simultaneous as 
well as sequential activity and allows a connection to be made between 
project-level activity and wider corporate strategy (Burgelman, 
1983) l . Because of its richness, it will be seen that the model 
offers potentially useful insights into the way in which firms obtain new 
buildings as part of the resource allocation process.
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Figure 3.1 Bower's model of resource allocation
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Bower's scheme charts the identification and development of investment 
projects in terms of three processes: project definition, impetus and 
determination of context. These processes have different phases 
associated with them which are broadly related to hierarchical levels 
within the firm: initiating, integrating and corporate.
Bower argued that the process by which capital investment projects were 
defined (definition) was initiated by lower level managers within the 
divisions whose concerns were production or 'facility-oriented'2. 
The technical aspects of this definition were largely resolved at this 
level of the firm. The extent to which these potential investment 
projects moved towards funding depended on the support provided by middle 
ranking managers (impetus). Top management did not participate directly 
in the process but could influence it by changing the organisational 
context within which lower level managers operated (this process Bower 
called 'determination of context').
Few of the decision models reviewed in chapter 2 offer a similarly 
structured framework for an examination of management action during the 
resource allocation process. Some of these, for example, focus in more 
detail on the steps or activities in the decision process (King, 1975; 
Mintzberg et al, 1976; Nutt, 1984). Others offer a contingency
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approach depending on the nature of the particular decisions or topics 
(Hickson et al, 1986), or a more explicit consideration of the effects 
of environment (Berry, 1984). However, they do not consider the 
interrelationship between decision activities and the organisational 
hierarchy in the way described by Bower. This is of particular relevance 
because of the general lack of recognition within the construction 
literature of the corporate client as a complex organisation. 
Additionally, within this literature the emphasis on the single 
authoritative voice implies a strong element of top management 
participation in investment decision making.
Bower's model provides a well documented framework which has received much 
support in subsequent empirical studies of the capital investment process 
and indeed, of the process of wider strategic decisions (see, for example, 
Hofer, 1976; Bower and Doz, 1979; Ireland et al, 1987). Although 
there have been few documented exercises to corroborate the model in its 
entirety (notable among these are Ackerman, 1970, who examined differences 
between integrated and diversified companies; Schwartz, 1973, who examined 
high technology companies; Prahalad, 1975, and Doz, 1980, who examined 
multinationals), elements of the model receive considerable support across 
a range of disciplines. Support for or challenges to particular aspects 
of the model will be addressed in the detailed description which follows.
More recently, Burgelman (1983), in an examination of the transformation 
of research and development activities into new business ventures, used 
Bower's model and added a separate process of 'strategic context' to 
describe the strategic process of creating new business. Burgelman found 
less support than advocated by Bower for the use of determination of 
context as a controlling mechanism by top management. This issue is 
returned to below. A number of authors have provided general support for 
the model as describing capital investment in the large firm as a 
'bottom-up' process of bargaining and choice spread across levels of the 
management hierarchy and over long periods of time, including in the USA 
Bettis and Prahalad (1983), Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988), Adler and 
Shenhar (1990), Fornell et al (1990), Schilit (1990), and in the UK 
Goold and Campbell (1987), Marsh et al (1988), Nahapiet (1988), 
Stopford and Baden-Fuller (1990), Butler et al (1991).
3.2.2 The process of definition
Bower locates the origins of investment projects in the operating levels 
of the firm, where a 'discrepancy' between production needs and available 
capacity is identified by those managers who are 'facility-oriented', ie 
plant managers, production managers and the like, responsible for 
production. This discrepancy is identified in response to information 
from specialist departments such as accounting (for example, when costs 
are too high), marketing (for example, when quality is too low, or sales 
volume is too low), research, or general management (for example, when a 
new product needs to be developed).
Between identifying such a discrepancy and submitting a proposal to top 
management for funding approval, the project gets defined (to some 
degree). The task of project definition was observed by Bower to have 
three distinct phases, each occurring at different levels across the 
organisation's hierarchy.
The discrepancy triggers an 'initiating phase' of the definition process. 
Bower located this in 'the product/market oriented sub-units' of the 
corporation. Here, the project begins to get defined in terms of 
productive capacity required, expected output, time of availability, cost, 
and so on.
At a higher level in the hierarchy there will be concern about aggregate 
financial performance, dividend policy and other matters such as 
government policy, public and labour relations, and corporate growth. 
Bower called the way in which these corporate concerns shape the project 
definition the 'corporate phase' of the definition process. This phase is 
triggered by a discrepancy between a 'company and its environment.'
The existence of these two contrasting phases implies an intermediate 
phase, identified as the 'integrating phase.' This consists of the 
transmission of the need for aggregate earnings downward in product-market 
terms to those who are concerned with product-market strategies, and the 
transmission of the need for resources upwards in financial terms to those
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concerned with corporate planning (Figure 3.1). This phase is triggered 
by a discrepancy 'between the plans of the sub-unit parts and the 
corporate whole' and is concerned with managing the 'part-whole' 
relationship3 .
Although three distinct phases of the definition process were identified, 
definition is largely a technical and economic process (King, 1975; 
Burgelman, 1983) where the initiating phase is the primary determinant 
(see Figure 3.2 below). The discrepancy identified by facility-oriented 
managers constitutes the main source of project definition.
3.2.3 The process of impetus
Once a project proposal begins to be defined, it must progress up the 
hierarchy of the organisation, passing through intermediate stages of 
approval before final authorisation by top management. Bower found that 
the rate at which a project does this depends on the "impetus" given to 
it. Impetus is defined as the force which moves a project toward funding, 
a largely political process involving commitment to, and sponsorship of, 
the project by managers at successively higher levels than that from where 
the project originates.
In an earlier work, Aharoni (1966) described the process by which managers 
make commitments to investment proposals which accumulated into personal 
and organisational 'stakes' on a proposal's success. He argued that such 
commitments were created through routine activities, such as collecting 
information, when
"...it is necessary to communicate with people, to make certain 
decisions, and often to give tacit promises. In this process 
commitments are accumulated until a situation is created which 
leads inevitably to investment."4
As with the process of definition, Bower describes impetus in terms of 
three distinct phases: initiating, integrating and corporate. The 
initiating phase involves the launch of the project as a proposal for 
funding - "Someone says 'I've got a great idea', and means it". The 
corporate phase is the ultimate stage of approval or rejection. Between 
these phases comes the necessary sponsorship by those managers whose
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'position and reputation give them the power to move projects to 
funding'5 . This integrating phase is the primary determinant of 
impetus, the source of which lies in intermediate levels of the 
corporation (Figure 3.2).
This analysis is not unique to Bower, for King's (1975) 'transmission' is 
analagous to Bower's impetus (see section 2.3.4 above). The idea of a 
socio-political process which moves major investment and/or strategic 
decisions towards funding receives much support in the literature (for 
example, Quinn, 1980; Schilit and Locke, 1982; Burgelman, 1983; 
Shrivastava and Grant, 1985; Hickson et al, 1986; Schilit and Paine, 
1987; Marsh et al, 1988; Schilit, 1984, 1990; Fornell et al 1990; 
Chenall and Morris, 1991).
3.2.4 The forces shaping definition and impetus
Bower argued that the way in which projects were defined and moved toward 
funding could be expected to be influenced by the corporate structure 
within which these processes take place. This leads to his central 
proposition that managerial behaviour may be influenced by top management 
who can change the corporate structure under their control - the formal 
organisation including the measurement, reward and punishment structure - 
and within which lower level managers operate.
The relationship between strategy, structure and business performance has 
become a dominant theme in the strategic management literature, typified 
by the work of Rumelt (1974) and Miles and Snow (1978). However, the use 
of structural context to influence behaviour is the most problematic and 
controversial of Bower's findings. First, this is because Bower sought to 
identify improvements in the investment process. This requires a prior 
view of what constitutes desirable behaviour (Berry, 1984). In 
particular, Bower assumes a congruence of corporate and personal goals 
among 'purposive managers' (a concept based on Simon's 'intendedly 
rational' man; see Simon, 1957) who are guided by a structure which helps 
them relate both sets of goals. This point is returned to in section 
3.3.8 below.
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Secondly, although there is support within the literature for the 
deliberate use of structure to influence managerial behaviour (for 
example, King, 1975; Cohen, 1983; Adler and Shenhar, 1990; Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 1991), other authors argue that the alteration of structural 
context is a crude and slow-working influence for individual projects 
(Burgelman, 1983; Bart, 1986; Marsh et al, 1988). In attempting to 
establish whether top management play an active part in the investment 
process, attention will also be paid to the possibility of direct 
intervention (Marsh et al, 1988).
3.2.5 The process of determination of context
Bower called the corporate structure which influences the sub-processes of 
resource allocation 'context', and distinguished between 'structural 
context' and 'situational context'. The former is described by the 
corporation's formal structure, that is, the information, control and 
measurement systems for both business and managerial performance. The 
latter includes the personal and historical circumstances of individual 
managers and projects. Situational context is important but unique to 
each particular situation. Bower considered it not amenable to 
generalisation and therefore left it out of his model6.
Figure 3.2 The resource allocation process as observed
Bower, (1970)
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There is a separate process by which structural context itself is 
determined. Bower considered this 'determination of context' to be the 
third sub-process of resource allocation. It has three phases, the most 
important of which is the corporate phase involving the choice of a new 
structure. The initiating phase indicates a discrepancy between strategy 
and results which is attributable to structure. The integrating phase is 
again concerned with the 'part-whole' relationship. This involves 
exploring the relationship between structure and business performance and 
recommending appropriate structural revisions.
3.2.6 A summary of the descriptive scheme
The model describes the process of resource allocation in terms of three 
important sub-processes:
1 definition, which determines the economic and technical content 
of investment projects;
2 impetus, which determines which projects come to pass;
3 determination of context, which shapes the definition and 
impetus processes.
Each sub-process may be examined in terms of 3 phases:
A initiating, involving identifying opportunities and needs at
the business level of the organisation; 
B corporate, concerned with aggregate financial needs and
decisions; 
C integrating, which translates the need for corporate earnings
into the needs and opportunities of business sub-units, and
vice versa.
The model describes resource allocation as a complex process spread across 
many levels of the firm. Because many of the key elements of the process 
are widely dispersed, the need for an integrating role to manage the 
'part-whole' relationship is defined. Although it is the descriptive 
framework of Bower's scheme which is relevant to this thesis,
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consideration of Bower's prescription for resource allocation brings into 
sharp focus the role of the integrating manager.
Bower's central proposition is that top management can influence managers' 
behaviour in desired directions by manipulating structural context. An 
essential element of structural context is measurement of performance. 
Therefore, before organisational structure is changed, information on the 
degree to which the resource allocation process is, or could be, producing 
desired results within the existing structure is needed.
Integrating managers, with their intimate knowledge of the strategic 
aspects of a variety of product-market sub-units, play a critical role by 
providing measurements of performance on which changes to structural 
context may be based. Even in the determination of context, where the 
corporate phase is the primary determinant, integrating managers perform a 
vital function. A key proposition for exploration in the present study 
concerns this integrating role in the implementation/construction phase of 
capital investment projects. This is discussed in the next section.
3.3 IMPLEMENTATION AS A RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS 
3.3.1 Resource allocation and the construction process
The process of resource allocation described by Bower ends with approval 
of a Capital Appropriations Request (CAR) by top management. Resources 
have been allocated, or rather, authorisation for the allocation of 
resources has been granted. At this point a project is defined in 
technical and financial terms. Although construction firms are likely to 
have been involved in project definition - at least to the extent which 
enables the building required to be costed to the accuracy normally 
expected in a CAR - the model does not accommodate their contribution.
The model and a good deal of the literature treats implementation as a 
separate process, occurring after approval of a proposal for funding. For 
that part of the project concerned with the procurement of a new factory, 
implementation involves constructing a building of the scope and within 
both the limit of expenditure and the timescale defined in the CAR.
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However, largely because the firm's requirements may change during this 
process, the present study considers management action during 
implementation in terms of the key sub-processes in Bower's model. This 
will help explore the utility of the model as a description of how the 
firm's management ensures that the new building procured is suitable for 
their firm's needs.
3.3.2 The process of redefinition
The nature of uncertainty surrounding the definition of the manufacturing 
firm's building needs has already been noted (chapter 1, section 
1.3.3)7 . Because of this uncertainty and the time taken to 
construct a new factory, it may be expected that the firm will monitor its 
requirements against project definition during implementation to help 
ensure that it gets a suitable building. Indeed it must do this or accept 
that the definition contained in the CAR will constitute the sole 
definition of the project, even though the requirements might have 
subsequently changed.
The process of monitoring, assessing and, if necessary, changing project 
definition during implementation involves prediction, analysis, definition 
and review or confirmation of viability, and is essentially part of an 
ongoing resource allocation process. More specifically, the process of 
redefining the project may be considered in terms of the process of 
definition in Bower's model. It will be triggered by a discrepancy 
between anticipated production needs and planned capacity. In the 
language of the model, the discrepancy will be identified by those whose 
concerns are 'facility-oriented' in response to information from 
specialist departments monitoring the firm's environment (for example, 
marketing might indicate that the initial forecasts were too low; or 
research might identify advantages of a new product or production 
process).
3.3.3 The process of incorporating change
When the change needed is of such a nature that approval by top management 
is required, the proposal for change will need sponsorship at successively
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higher levels than where it originates. The process of getting projects 
changed may therefore be viewed in terms of the process of impetus in 
Bower's model.
However, an additional, critical factor is present when the project is 
being implemented. As well as obtaining top management approval for such 
change, the participation and co-operation of construction firms must also 
be obtained. During implementation, then, impetus is about the firm's 
management of external as well as internal processes.
3.3.4 An outline scheme for project implementation
It is now possible to consider Bower's model as a framework for the 
examination of management action during project implementation (see Figure 
3.3 below). The processes of redefining the project and incorporating 
changes may be described in terms of the model's sub-processes of 
definition and impetus. The initiating phase is the primary determinant 
of redefinition: as with definition, a discrepancy identified by 
facility-oriented managers which triggers this process is expected to 
constitute the main source of project redefinition. The integrating phase 
is the primary determinant of the process of changing projects.
Figure 3.3 An outline model of resource allocation during 
implementation
Process 
Phase
CORPORATE
INTEGRATING
INITIATING
DEFINITION 
(Redefinition)
Aggregate, Financial 
Company   Environment
Financi 
Aggreg;
N
ai 
ite
/
T
Product 
Market 
Strategic
Strategic Product/Market 
(Will product/market needs be 
served by the new building?)
IMPETUS 
(Implementing change)
Yes or No
The cor 
"wants"
\
npany
/
s\
The businesses 
"want"
I've got a "great" idea 
(The original idea needs to be 
changed)
DETERMINATION OF 
CONTEXT
Determine/agree structural 
context
Corpor; 
needs
\
»tc
/
/\
Subunit 
needs
Product/Market not served 
by structure
After Bower (1970)
66
An important proposition arises here: it is that some of those managers 
who decide to sponsor change to a project's scope are likely to be the 
ones who will implement it. This is consistent with the model where top 
management do not actively participate in the process of resource 
allocation. This raises questions about top management's indirect role, 
and the motivating forces behind the commitment of lower level managers. 
These will now be considered.
3.3.5 The forces influencing redefinition and the incorporation of change
The importance of managerial commitment to impetus has been noted above. 
Bower found that the extent to which managers believed the forecasts, etc, 
on which projects were based influenced their personal commitment to 
obtaining approval. Indeed, given the level of commitment required to 
move investment projects towards funding, it may be argued that projects 
become harder to reject the higher up the management hierarchy they 
progress. However, in the context of change during implementation, such 
commitment may be somewhat double-edged. Changing projects during 
implementation may reflect poorly on managerial judgement8. For 
this reason, managerial commitment may be as great a force resisting 
change as it may be in implementing it.
The model considers structural context in terms of its influence on the 
processes of decision making, bargaining and choice which occur within the 
firm. The involvement of construction firms outwith the corporate 
structure raises the question of whether structural context can also 
influence these agents. This will now be addressed.
3.3.6 The role of structural context
With the concept of the 'temporary multiorganization' (Cherns and Bryant, 
1984), construction firms may be seen to come within a 'structural 
context' which may influence the way in which projects get implemented 
and/or changed. More particularly, the formal contractual and management 
arrangements between the client firm and construction firms for the supply
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of the new factory create a form of 'structural context', in that they 
determine a punishment and reward structure, flows of information and 
control mechanisms between organisations9. Such context may be 
considered 'structural' (as opposed to 'situational') in that formal 
contracts will come into being, at least for the duration of the 
construction project.
In terms of the model, the tasks of selecting, negotiating and placing 
consultant's commissions, project management arrangements, construction 
contracts, etc are all part of a process of determination of context. 
However, this process may be distinguished from that observed by Bower in 
at least three ways.
The first is that, although these agreements may be determined in the 
client firm's interests, they have tended to become standardised along 
lines which arguably reflect construction's need as much as, if not more 
than, client requirements (see for example, British Property Federation 
criticisms of traditional procurement arrangements, British Property 
Federation, 1983). But it is this standardisation rather than any inbuilt 
bias which may inhibit attempts to determine such context in the client 
firm's interests (see for example, Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, 
1982).
Secondly, because these agreements have a limited life, the extent to 
which they may be adjusted to influence behaviour in desired directions 
may be limited. The relatively short duration of building contracts, for 
example, may make it difficult to assess the relationship between the 
client's criteria and construction's performance on which changes to this 
structural context may be based. Indeed, as in the case of Bower's 
'context', an explanatory theory relating different forms of building 
procurement arrangements to particular client requirements is still a goal 
for research (Brandon et al, 1988; Kelly et al, 1992). In any 
event, the financial effort involved in changing these arrangements once 
they have been agreed may be punitive and a successful outcome is far from 
certain.
Thirdly, the kinds of arrangements being discussed here arise relatively 
infrequently. Opportunities to influence future behaviour may thus be
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rare. The process of determination of context in Bower's model is 
initiated by a discrepancy between "strategy and results that is 
attributed to structure"; ie context is adjusted after poor 
performance10. In the present study, however, the emphasis is on 
the prior determination of context in the expectation that behaviour may 
need to be influenced in a desired direction.
In summary, structural context is considered important during 
implementation, both because it may facilitate change to project 
definition and, perhaps more importantly, because it may constrain it. 
The point has been made previously that the very act of implementing 
projects through time makes change to project definition progressively 
more difficult. Personal commitment and contractual arrangements may 
constrain changes to project definition, but both are necessary if the 
firm is to obtain a new factory of the kind needed. A descriptive 
framework of the process by which the firm ensures that it gets the 
building it needs must consider forces which enhance and constrain 
managerial ability during implementation.
3.3.7 Assumptions about behaviour
Underlying the concept of determination of context (and the other 
sub-processes of resource allocation) in Bower's model are assumptions 
about corporate objectives and about behaviour in business organisations. 
Bower assumes that the corporation is a 'purposive' institution whose 
objectives are primarily growth in the earnings stream. Managers are also 
purposive, pursuing wealth and power goals. Personal and corporate goals 
are closely linked by structural context.
To attempt to apply this model to the implementation phase of capital 
projects is not to eschew completely the behavioural attack on the theory 
of the firm - indeed the model explicitly recognises the existence of 
coalitions of diverse individuals within the firm and the likely internal 
goal conflict which may arise (Cyert and March, 1963). However, in 
Bower's model such internal goal conflict may be resolved via a process of 
integration whereas Cyert and March argue that goals are attended to 
sequentially. Carter (1971) argues that Bower's model recognises the
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importance of organisational hierarchy, and that this has the effect of 
'filtering' sub-unit goals. Further, whereas Cyert and March were 
concerned with operating decisions, Bower and Carter were concerned with 
strategic decisions which are likely to involve more people at more levels 
in the organisation 11 .
Further, the present study does not begin with an assumption that sub-unit 
and corporate goals are the same nor is it motivated by the need for 
prescription. Berry (1984) argues that because Bower attempts to 
prescribe improvements for the management of resource allocation, 
assumptions about managerial behaviour were required which led to a 
consideration of capital investment as a "decomposition of an imputed top 
management role" 12. However, the propositions outlined below permit 
an exploration of the use of structural context; they do not require that 
sub-unit and corporate goals be aligned as a precondition to help describe 
management action. Indeed, other challenges to structural context as a 
mechanism whereby such goal alignment may be achieved have already been 
noted, which admit the possibility of a more direct top management role.
3.3.8 Conclusion
The foregoing discussion has outlined the potential usefulness of Bower's 
model as a framework within which management action may be examined during 
the decision and implementation stages of capital investment projects. 
The concepts of definition, impetus and determination of context may 
provide useful insights into how the firm's management ensures that a 
suitable new building is obtained, particularly when requirements change.
Redefinition is a process of identification, measurement and analysis; a 
largely technical/economic process which determines options for the 
redefinition of the project but does not, of itself, change it. The 
process of changing the project is primarily a political/managerial 
process, involving 'integrating level' managers who will either have 
delegated responsibility to sanction the change themselves, or will 
present a case for change to top management. These managers will perform 
the role of construction 'client'.
Much of the discussion has focused on the implementation of change to the 
project during construction. This is not to imply that the need to change 
the project must arise before the firm acts to ensure it gets a suitable 
new building. Rather, the possibility of change is all that is required. 
And this is present in most, if not all, factory building investment 
projects. Ensuring that a suitable building is procured is as much about 
confirming that the original project definition is robust as it is about 
changing it.
In the terms of the model, those 'integrating level' managers who provide 
impetus by reconciling corporate requirements with sub-unit needs will 
also reconcile both of these with the needs of construction firms to get 
projects implemented. A need for integration 13 of their respective 
project needs may therefore be defined between the client firm and 
construction firms during implementation.
The structure within which managers operate may be expected to influence 
the way in which projects get implemented, redefined and changed. This 
includes the arrangements between the client firm and construction firms 
for the supply of the new building. There is a separate process by which 
this latter 'structure' in particular is determined. A question for 
research is whether particular attention is paid to this, given the 
limited extent to which this structure may subsequently be adjusted. The 
study propositions can now be stated.
3.4 RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS
3.4.1 Restatement of the research problems
The problems identified in chapter 1 will now be rephrased to enable 
useful propositions for research to be identified. In the model and in 
much of the literature, implementation is treated as a separate process 
from investment which occurs after approval of a proposal for funding. No 
allowance is made for how the firm may manage the contribution of 
construction to:
1 the process of defining building needs (facility definition);
2 the process of moving investment proposals towards funding.
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Similarly, little attention is paid to the way in which change to facility 
definition is incorporated, either:
3 following submission of an investment proposal but prior to 
final authorisation;
4 following final authorisation and, especially, once 
construction has started.
3.4.2 Study propositions
The process of definition
The first proposition concerns the involvement of the construction 
industry in facility definition prior to the submission of an investment 
proposal to top management:
A In the large diversified firm the process of definition occurs 
across many levels of the management hierarchy and involves input 
from construction firms outwith the corporate structure.
The integrating phase in the definition process reconciles the need for 
corporate earnings with the needs of individual businesses. But both 
these sets of needs must also be reconciled with questions of what can be 
built, how, where, when, and at what cost. This is a further 
complication to the integrating phase activity but a necessary one. 
Although the main source of facility definition is to be found in a 
discrepancy identified by facility-oriented managers,
B The process of definition will be managed as an 'integrating-phase' 
activity by managers to whom the firm will delegate its 
responsibility as construction client.
Note that neither business-level managers - who define what facilities are 
needed - nor top management - who determine what investment funds are 
available - necessarily have a direct role in representing the firm as 
construction client.
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The process of impetus
Bower found that impetus was generated by the commitment of managers who 
had an interest in ensuring the success of the investment proposal. Prior 
to submitting the investment proposal to top management for funding 
approval,
C Managers with responsibility as construction client can use the 
involvement of construction to help generate impetus, in 
particular, by:
i) requiring expenditure on the project prior to final
authorisation by top management;
ii) making the achievement of project objectives - for example
as to cost or timing - contingent on an early approval of the
proposal.
Changing project definition prior to funding approval
Following the submission of a proposal for funding, the likelihood that 
the project or facility definition will be substantially changed or 
rejected through the intervention of higher level managers becomes less 
the more impetus it gathers. This is partly due to the impetus already 
accumulated, and partly because the information necessary to change 
definition is often available only to facility oriented managers lower 
down the hierarchy.
D The original perception of a discrepancy identified by facility 
oriented managers will constitute the sole source of facility 
definition unless explicit steps are taken higher up the management 
hierarchy to introduce other issues.
The role of top management
Bower found that top management did not participate directly in the 
resource allocation process. However, they could influence the process
indirectly by manipulating the organisational structure within which 
managers who were involved more directly in the process operated.
E Top management's direct role in the definition of facilities is 
restricted to a budgetary/financial sanction.
F Top management can influence facility definition indirectly by 
manipulating the structural context within which lower level 
managers operate.
Getting facilities built
Following final authorisation by top management, project definition does 
not cease. Despite construction involvement prior to this, the facility 
will only have been defined in terms sufficient for an assessment of 
feasibility. The focus of facility definition will now be on refining 
what has already been defined within the limit of expenditure in the 
investment proposal. If top management's direct role in the definition of 
facilities is financial - ie if proposition E is supported - then
G All aspects of facility definition - except the limit of 
expenditure in the investment proposal - may be changed without top 
management approval.
H Those integrating-level managers with responsibility as 
construction client will manage the facility definition process to 
help ensure that the building required is obtained within the limit 
of funding available.
Major change following funding approval
However, the source of change to project definition will continue to be 
found in a discrepancy identified by 'facility oriented' managers. 
Particularly where such change requires more funding than authorised by 
top management, considerable impetus will be needed to obtain it. The 
implementation of change can involve considerable managerial effort,
depending both on the nature and extent of the change and when in the 
construction project it is to be introduced. It follows from proposition 
B above that the implementation of this change is an integrating-phase 
activity.
Where the likelihood that major change will be needed during construction 
is high,
I Integrating-level managers with responsibility as construction 
client will determine a form of structural context between the firm 
and construction to facilitate the incorporation of change.
3.5 CONCLUSION
The study propositions follow directly from a consideration of management 
action in terms of Bower's resource allocation model. The model and 
propositions are concerned with the process by which the large firm 
allocates scarce resources to purchase capital assets. In particular, the 
model emphasises the investment 'decision' as a process taking place 
across many levels of the corporate hierarchy.
In so far as is known, no serious exploration of the process by which the 
large manufacturing firm obtains a new factory has yet been undertaken 
within this framework. Indeed, as has been argued in chapter 2, the 
construction literature lacks a focus on the corporate client and little 
attention is paid to the client perspective. This thesis therefore 
explores some of the implications of empirical studies of the capital 
investment process for the way in which corporate clients make and 
implement industrial building investment decisions.
Rather than testing the validity of the propositions however, the primary 
concern is with examining whether they offer useful explanations for 
management action during the decision and implementation stages of capital 
investment projects. The next chapter outlines the research design and 
discusses methodological issues involved in developing a research strategy 
which can adequately explore these questions.
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3.6 FOOTNOTES
1 Burgelman (1983), p229.
2 Bower argues that the responsibility for facilities is usually 
assigned to production managers, plant managers or engineers. 
'Facility-oriented' is defined to mean
"that those aspects of such jobs which are measured and for 
which the manager holding the job is rewarded or punished, have 
to do with aspects of a facility."(1970, pp 48-9).
3 All quotes in this section, see Bower (1970), pp74-7.
4 Aharoni (1966) in King (1975), p74.
5 Bower (1970), pp77-8.
6 See Bower (1970) pp71-2, 276-8 for a discussion of situational 
context.
7 Capital investment decision making is characterised by a high level 
of uncertainty concerning almost all aspects of the decision, for 
example market knowledge, technology, the costs and availability of 
financial and other resources, and so on (see for example, Kennedy 
and Sugden, 1986, pp34-5).
8 See for example, Goold and Campbell (1987), Chapter 1.
9 These are the main elements of structural context as Bower defines 
it (1970, p71).
10 Bower (1970), pp78-9.
11 Carter (1971), p421.
12 Berry (1984), p79.
13 Lawrence and Lorsch have defined integration as
"the quality of the state of collaboration that exists among 
departments that are required to achieve unity of effort by the 
demands of the environment" (1967, pll).
This definition embraces both the process by which the state (of 
collaboration) is achieved and the organisational devices used to 
achieve it, as well as the state itself. Such collaboration may be 
expected to include both explicit 'structural' devices (ie 
structural context, in the language of Bower's model) and implicit 
'political' ones (eg the interpersonal skills of managers).
76
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
4.1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 78
4.2 STRATEGIES AND CHOICES: THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCESS 78
4.2.1 The nature of the enquiry 78
4.2.2 Approaches and choices 79
4.2.3 The case study approach: tradition and
point of departure 80
4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 82
4.3.1 Unit of analysis 82
4.3.2 Single and multiple cases 82
4.3.3 Criteria for case selection 83
4.4 IDENTIFICATION OF CASE STUDIES 85
4.4.1 Identification 85
4.4.2 Access 87
4.4.3 The cases selected
4.5 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 89
4.5.1 Case boundaries 89
4.5.2 Focus on qualitative techniques 90
4.5.3 Interviewing 90
4.5.4 Documentary material 92
4.6 METHOD OF REPORTING 94
4.7 FOOTNOTES 96
4.1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
This chapter focuses on the research strategy and methods used to examine 
the study propositions raised in chapter 3. In particular, attention is 
paid to the exploratory nature of the research and the use of qualitative 
techniques for data collection and analysis. The selection of cases and 
the detailed research method are described and the discussion concludes 
with a description of how the cases are reported in chapters 5 and 6.
4.2 STRATEGIES AND CHOICES: THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCESS 
4.2.1 The nature of the enquiry
Chapter 2 developed the argument that the construction literature, with 
its prescriptive orientation and its characterisation of the unitary 
client, lacks a conceptual scheme to examine the research problems from 
the corporate client's perspective. This discussion was extended in 
chapter 3. There, Bower's resource allocation model was examined as a 
potentially useful framework for addressing research problems arising from 
consideration of the literature on capital investment decision making and 
construction management.
In particular, the model suggests propositions for research which direct 
attention to key features of the decision and implementation stages of 
capital investment projects. It also provides a framework for analysis. 
Although well documented, and tried in the corporate strategy area in 
particular (see for example, Burgelman, 1983), Bower's model has not been 
used for an examination of the questions addressed in this research. In 
the present study the propositions are used in an attempt to explore the 
process by which the large manufacturing firm makes and implements capital 
investment decisions as part of resource allocation.
Used in this way, the model offers a conceptual scheme rather than a 
quantitative or symbolic device which the term normally connotes. It is 
the descriptive nature of the model which is of benefit here in 
representing the human and organisational terms of the complex process of
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resource allocation which are not easily examined quantitatively.
For these reasons, the research strategy chosen was the intensive, 
case-based approach in the tradition of Bower (1970), King (1975), 
Burgelman (1983), Cherns and Bryant (1984), Marsh et al (1988) and 
Butler et al (1991), for example, with a consequent emphasis on 
qualitative research techniques.
4.2.2 Approaches and choices
Although some studies of corporate decision making have used broadly based 
surveys (for example, Mintzberg et al, 1976; Hickson et al, 1986), 
the case-based approach with its focus on a small number of firms was 
particularly appropriate here for a number of reasons. First, there has 
been no accumulation of research evidence on the corporate client role in 
construction projects which would allow the concepts in question to be 
refined or the complex features of interest to be conceptualised in a form 
which makes them amenable to quantitative analysis.
Secondly, the argument developed up to this point lays considerable stress 
on the capital investment decision as a complex process occurring over 
many levels of the corporate hierarchy and over long periods of time. The 
need for multiple informants and other sources of information to examine 
this complexity (which can be accommodated within the case study approach 
and, indeed, is a feature of it; Yin et al, 1983) is not well served 
by 'broadcast' survey methods with their emphasis on single respondents, 
pre-determined questions and ready structured responses.
Thirdly, the potential influence of the organisational structure and of 
the firm's wider business environment has been noted. A means is needed 
by which the investment decision and implementation processes may be 
examined in their natural setting. The case study approach permits a 
consideration of the organisational and business context within which 
investment decisions are made and implemented. Its potential for this 
type of in-depth analysis is an important element in its choice for the 
present study.
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4.2.3 The case study approach: tradition and point of departure
While the case study has a long tradition in political science and social 
anthropology (Mitchell, 1983 1 ), it has only recently been used 
within the business administration area. Within the construction 
literature, case studies have tended towards the illustrative rather than 
the descriptive or analytical. However, recent research in construction 
management has utilised the case study method to focus on problems of 
project organisation and interrelationships between project participants 
(for example, Lansley et al, 1979; Walker and Hughes, 1984; Bresnen, 
1986,1988; Dodd and Langford, 1990).
The chosen research strategy departs from that adopted by the many studies 
which utilise a longitudinal approach based on direct or participant 
observation. Although the longitudinal element was important, the author 
was unable to adopt the role of either participant or direct observer. 
When fieldwork was undertaken the author was employed in a national 
construction consultancy. No projects on which the author's firm were 
engaged were available as case studies, and access to projects for direct 
observation on which competitor consultancies were engaged could not be 
gained2. Instead, recently completed projects were sought with the 
aim of examining the project history through the recollections of 
participants and through documentary sources (Webb et al, 1966). The 
chosen approach therefore contains elements of case history3 as well 
as case study method. (The criteria for identification and selection of 
cases are outlined below).
While the 'history' in question was relatively recent - one project had 
not been completed when fieldwork started, the other had been completed 
about eight years - aspects of the process by which investment decisions 
and choices are made are inevitably missed when there is no opportunity 
for direct observation. While this might be a limitation of the chosen 
approach, not even the directly-observing researcher can be in all places 
at once (Zelditch, 1962), and must therefore chose in advance 'events' for 
observation, some of which may prove to be unimportant. With direct 
observation there may be less opportunity for informants to 'post- 
rationalise' decisions and actions but a particular advantage of the
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case history approach is that linkages may be made in the data during 
collection both backwards and forwards in time. Forward linkages are not 
possible for the directly-observing researcher during data collection. In 
any event, the distinction between direct observation and a post-hoc 
examination of events is not so clear. There will always be elements of 
history in informants' accounts and, particularly, in documentary material 
which is likely to provide a valuable source of data for studies of the 
investment processes of interest4.
Finally, there are pragmatic reasons - unconnected with the author's 
employment - for the choice of completed projects. Firstly, although the 
boundaries of the process to be examined extend from the origins of 
projects to the completion of construction work (see section 4.5.1 below), 
such origins would be very difficult to identify in advance to enable the 
directly-observing researcher to negotiate access in time and be present 
during the course of a necessarily unpredictable process5 . 
Secondly, in the large firm it is likely that many possible investment 
projects are identified but never progress to construction projects. 
Tracking investment decisions in real-time could result in much abortive 
work. Thirdly, the decision and implementation processes may extend over 
many years and it may not always be possible to stay with the project for 
its duration.
The concentration on completed projects therefore, whilst turning on 
pragmatic considerations concerning difficulties associated with 
identifying and tracking investment projects in real time, also allows an 
assessment to be made of the suitability of any potential case prior to 
inclusion in the study. Yin (1984) argues that as case studies rely on 
analytical rather than statistical generalisation6, each case in a 
multi-case research design is selected for a specific purpose7 . 
However, to do this requires prior knowledge about the cases to be 
selected. As a key problem to be investigated concerns the management of 
change to facility definition during the decision and implementation 
process, concentration on completed projects enables potential cases to be 
identified which permit an examination of this phenomenon. The criteria 
for case selection will now be discussed in the context of the research 
design.
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4.3. RESEARCH DESIGN
4.3.1 Unit of analysis
The study questions (chapter 2) and the study propositions (chapter 3) 
have already been identified. In chapter 1 the unit of analysis was 
identified as the large manufacturing firm; more precisely this may be 
defined as those parts of the firm - managers and personnel, taken 
collectively and individually - involved in the decision and 
implementation stages of a capital investment project. The focus is on 
decisions relating to the construction of a new factory building and 
projects involving such investment provide the setting for the 
investigation.
4.3.2 Single and multiple cases
The number of cases to be examined is an important methodological as well 
as pragmatic consideration. Access was expected to be a particular 
problem for intensive internal studies of the decision processes of large 
firms. (Indeed, around the time when access was being negotiated, 
revelations in the mass media concerning management malpractice in a 
number of large UK firms8 contributed to firms' wariness of 
approaches for internal studies; see section 4.4.2 below.) However, the 
circumstances in which a single case is generally felt to be appropriate 
(the critical or deviant case: Hakim, 1987; or the revelatory case: Yin, 
1984) did not apply on the present study. Hakim argues further that, for 
a small number of cases, there is an advantage in selecting cases to cover 
the likely range in variation which may be expected, perhaps starting with 
the extremes9.
The approach then was to select two cases for study and to utilise the 
opportunity for comparison and contrast by selecting cases between which 
differences were to be expected with respect to the key propositions and 
features of interest. A key problem to be investigated concerns how the 
firm copes with uncertainty over facility definition and change arising 
during the decision and implementation stages of resource allocation. 
Clearly the occurrence of major change to facility definition may be
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expected to pose problems for those integrating-level managers with 
responsibility as construction client. Although much would depend on the 
nature and scope of the change and when in the process it arose, generally 
in such a case it may expected that propositions D and G to I (in section 
3.4.2 above) would be particularly helpful in exploring the action of 
those integrating-level managers in ensuring that a suitable new building 
is obtained. Conversely, a case where facility definition was determined 
early in the definition process and did not alter substantially throughout 
its subsequent development and construction would provide a contrary 
perspective. In particular, this would allow a consideration of how 
useful are propositions D and G to I in exploring management action in 
circumstances where the possibility of change existed but did not occur 
(see section 3.3.8 above).
One case was therefore sought where major changes to facility definition 
occurred throughout the definition and construction processes. A second 
case was sought where such change did not occur. As will be seen, the 
cases finally selected differed from each other in a number of other 
respects, in particular in the extent to which the resource allocation 
process took place across the corporate hierarchy and over time. Although 
it was expected that no two cases selected for study would have similar 
organisational or temporal characteristics, the differences noted have 
provided additional opportunities for discussion and analysis and are 
particularly relevant to propositions A to C and E to F.
4.3.3 Criteria for case selection
Although the search for case studies concentrated on identifying completed 
factory building projects in the first instance, criteria for the 
selection of cases related primarily to the large manufacturing firm as 
the unit of analysis. Put simply, the aim was to identify large 
manufacturing firms which had a divisional structure and had recently 
constructed a factory building for their own use as a production 
facility.
It was necessary to make these criteria operational to enable suitable 
firms to be identified. This was not to define a 'population' of large
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manufacturing firms from which a sample might be drawn; there is no 
attempt made in the analysis of case material to relate study findings to 
a wider population. Rather, given the need to select cases of interest, 
and the problems which were expected with access, criteria were defined to 
help identify sufficient potential cases from which a final selection 
could be made.
The task, then, was to identify large diversified firms involved in 
'manufacturing', which was taken to mean those activities within divisions 
2, 3 and 4 of the Standard Industrial Classification (Central Statistics 
Office, 1986), excepting the extraction industries (classes 21 and 23). 
Secondly, firms were considered large if they came within the top 250 
firms in the Times 1000' (The Times, 1988) listing, which helped provide 
a recognised measure of'largeness' 10.
The criterion of diversification is rather more difficult to make 
operational than those concerning size or the nature of activities. As 
investment projects were required which arose from the divisions so as to 
explore the questions of interest, firms with a divisional structure were 
therefore needed as case study hosts. Channon (1973), drawing on Wrigley 
(1970) and Scott (1971) has identified three categories of structure: 
functional, multi-divisional and holding company. The important 
distinction here is between the functional form, which is characterised by 
a collection of specialised functions organised hierarchically under the 
office of a chief executive, and the multi-divisional or holding company 
forms, which are characterised by collections of autonomous operating 
divisions and/or subsidiary companies controlled by a corporate office. 
The extent to which the relationship between the corporate centre and the 
sub-units will vary depending on the extent of diversification, 
international scope and size is of less interest11 .
As well as arising from the divisions, investment projects were required 
which needed the approval of top management. Additionally, in the 
tradition of Bower (1970), Carter (1971), King et al (1975), Burgelman 
(1983), Marsh et al (1988) and Butler et al (1991), for example, 
investment projects were sought which were of sufficient scope to involve 
the firm concerned in a major strategic investment. A distinction may be
made between investment decisions which are concerned with the firm's 
ongoing business activities, and the more discrete investment decisions of 
strategic consequence. Bower (1970) defines the former as belonging to 
the process of 'routine' change and the latter to the process of 
'critical' change. Such critical change involves business planning, which 
is defined as the selection of market opportunities and the identification 
of products required to serve these markets and investment planning, 
involving the selection of investment projects to generate the products 
required to be sold in the chosen markets12. The investment 
projects of interest to this thesis were expected to arise from these 
critical business and investment planning processes.
Criteria relating to the structure of the firm and the significance of the 
investment project could only be satisfied following discussion with the 
potential case study host. The tactics for identifying potential case 
studies will now be discussed.
4.4 IDENTIFICATION OF CASE STUDIES 
4.4.1 Identification
There were two possible approaches to the identification of case studies 
meeting all these criteria. The first was to identify firms which met the 
initial selection criteria relating to activities and size and to 
establish whether these had recently undertaken capital investment 
projects of the kind required. This suffers from the disadvantage that 
the initial approach to the firm is of a general nature, without a project 
to focus it. A more project-centred approach was preferred involving 
identifying completed industrial building projects and then establishing 
whether the sponsoring firms could satisfy criteria relating to activities 
undertaken, size and structure. Provided individual managers involved in 
particular projects of interest could be identified, this second approach 
offered a greater likelihood of success and was therefore adopted.
A means was therefore required by which completed industrial building 
projects and their sponsors could be identified. Some of the construction
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periodicals regularly publish details of different kinds of building 
projects to help their largely 'trade' readership identify sales and other 
business opportunities. Clients, consultants and contractors may be 
identified, together with the type, location and value of the project. 
Projects identified are usually at planning stage or about to go to 
tender. It was assumed that, given a likely cycle of planning approval, 
design, tendering and construction of between one and two years, details 
of projects appearing in periodicals which were two years or more out of 
date would, in general, relate to completed projects (accepting of course 
that not all of the projects identified in this way would have been 
built). The brief details of client, consultants and contractors provided 
could then be used to find out more about the project and client 
organisation and, ultimately, to help gain access.
The starting point was to examine the Contract News Service section in 
'Building', the Business Leads section of 'Construction News', and the 
Business Alert section of 'Contract Journal' from the beginning of 1988. 
Only a small number of suitable projects were identified for the period 
1988 to 1989 and the search was therefore extended back through the 
periodicals until some 50 projects were identified. Projects for firms 
outside of the top 250 of the Times 1000 were rejected. As a large number 
of relatively small projects were identified by this means, only those 
projects with a construction value in excess of £lm were selected 
(although somewhat arbitrary, it was felt that this limit would help 
identify projects of importance sufficient to satisfy criteria relating to 
the strategic significance of investment projects).
From the initial list of 50 a shortlist of 12 was drawn up. The search 
was for two projects, one where major change to facility definition was 
incorporated and another where no such change occurred. Prior to 
approaching individual firms it was not generally possible to establish 
whether change had occurred on the projects of interest. At this initial 
stage the approach was simply to ensure that the shortlist reflected a 
range of product/markets, from the rapidly changing high-technology 
industries to the lower technology industries more traditionally 
associated with manufacturing. The 12 firms identified came from a total 
of nine industries as follows:
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Aerospace
Industrial Electronics
Consumer Electronics
Pharmaceuticals
Food
Building bricks
Packaging
Milk processing
Engineering/defence
In a small number of cases some of the consultants and contractors 
involved on the projects identified were known to the author. In all 
cases attempts were made to find out who in the client organisation had 
been involved closely with the project, either through personal contact or 
by approaching the consultants or contractors involved.
4.4.2 Access
In seven of the twelve projects it was possible to obtain personal 
introductions to managers within the client organisation who had been 
closely involved in their projects. In all twelve cases these individuals 
were telephoned and given a brief introduction to the present study. For 
those who wished to proceed further, this was followed by a more formal 
request for participation in the study in the form of a letter and a 
briefing note for case study hosts which outlined the study, its aims and 
what was required of the host organisation (see Appendix A). Cherns and 
Bryant (1984) argue that, for a study of client organisations, a basis 
must exist between client and researcher for negotiating a relationship 
which has something to offer the client. The letter and briefing note 
emphasised the practical elements of the study and the benefits clients 
could expect from sharing in the study findings which would relate 
observations and analysis of their involvement in the construction process 
to that of other firms.
Three of the twelve firms approached initially refused access outright. 
Following correspondence with the remaining nine firms, the contact 
personnel were telephoned again to discuss possible participation. The
idea was to hold face to face meetings with each manager to explain in 
more detail the nature of the research and to explore and negotiate what 
access would be required. The author was concerned to ensure that 
participating firms would not withdraw access at some unspecified future 
point in fieldwork. Face-to-face meetings were granted by seven firms, 
three of which were particularly interested in participation. Although 
contact was maintained with the other four firms and attempts made to 
encourage participation, each one eventually withdrew during a period of 
some twelve months (mid 1990 to mid 1991).
During these initial meetings, the nature of access required and that 
likely to be available was discussed. A sample case study ('Spectrasorb' 
from Bower, 1970) was presented as indicative of the kind of approach 
which would be adopted. All potential hosts indicated that access to top 
management would be difficult, if not impossible. Further, all were 
concerned that the author be conversant with the project before 
approaching other personnel within the host organisation.
It is worth noting that gaining entry to the case sites did not resolve 
the problem of access in one stroke; it was rather the first step in a 
process of gaining the confidence of those who decided to support the 
study progressively to enable more information and individuals to be made 
available (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983). It may be noted that although 
these 'sponsors' gave considerably of their time and effort, access to the 
full site was ultimately partial in each case.
cases 
Discussion with managers involved in the three firms who had indicated an 
interest in the research established that in two of these - both in the 
pharmaceuticals industry - major changes had occurred in both the decision 
and implementation stages of the investment projects of interest. The 
most promising of these was a factory called K2A for the production of a 
paediatric antibiotic for Glaxo Pharmaceuticals at Barnard Castle and this 
was selected for study. The building project was on site when access was 
negotiated (May to June 1990) and was expected to be completed in August 
1990. Two major changes had already occurred, one during design and the
other shortly following start on site. Initial contact was made with 
Glaxo's project manager. The manager in the other UK-based pharmaceutical 
company indicated that the company would not be prepared to participate on 
grounds of commercial confidentiality if the study involved the Glaxo 
project.
The second case involved a factory called Dreadnought for the manufacture 
and assembly of armoured fighting vehicles for Vickers Defence Systems at 
Newcastle. Initial contact was made with the Vickers Defence Systems 
commercial director with respect to a project completed in 1986 in Leeds. 
However, access was not granted to the Leeds project; instead the earlier 
Newcastle project (completed in 1982) was offered. Initial discussions 
established that there were no major changes during construction and that 
key personnel and documentation were available for a case study.
The cases selected and the host organisations are described in 
considerable detail in chapters 5 and 6 below.
4.5 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
4.5.1 Case boundaries
The intention is to study the investment process from the origins of 
projects through to the completion of construction work on site. Although 
the latter may be defined relatively precisely - albeit somewhat 
artificially - in time by, for example, the issue of a certificate of 
practical completion of construction works 13, the former is more 
difficult to identify. Whilst accepting that a project's 'pre-history' 
may be important to an examination of subsequent developments (Cherns and 
Bryant, 1984), a pragmatic approach has been adopted for the 
identification of project origins. Projects were taken to have commenced 
when, in the opinion of the majority of informants, the first deliberate 
steps were taken which resulted eventually in the construction of the new 
factory (the origins of the cases examined are discussed more fully in 
chapters 5 and 6 below).
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4.5.2 Focus on qualitative techniques
The exploratory nature of this study together with the current status of 
the theoretical concepts to be used argue for a reliance on qualitative 
research techniques. Indeed, the focus on the management of the 
investment decision and implementation processes within the hierarchical 
organisation, and the emphasis on completed projects means that a good 
deal of the research material had to be obtained from people's own 
accounts of events and of their role in the processes of interest.
In any event, while qualitative techniques predominated, quantitative data 
concerning estimates, forecasts, plans etc were also used. Crompton and 
Jones (1988) provide a useful summary:
"..in organizational research it is not a mutually exclusive 
decision between quantitative and qualitative methodology. In 
reality it is very difficult to study organizations without using 
both sorts of methods. In any event quantitative data always rests 
on qualitative distinctions." 14
Semi-structured interviewing and analysis of project specific 
documentation as well as more general documentation relating to the 
organisation and project history provided empirical data on which this 
study is based.
4.5.3 Interviewing
Following entry to each case site, ie after the initial correspondence and 
the first face-to-face meeting, a depth interview was held with the 
author's main point of contact in each client organisation. This was 
loosely structured and designed to identify the nature and scope of the 
project, the key individuals involved - in the opinion of the informant - 
and the informant's own role. These interviews were not tape-recorded and 
lasted two and three hours (Vickers and Glaxo respectively). Notes were 
written up as soon as possible afterwards and descriptions of the project 
were ordered into a largely chronological sequence and were then 
structured under headings relating to groups of study propositions (see 
the headings in chapter 3, section 3.4.2).
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The intention at this stage was not to fit this data to the conceptual 
scheme, but rather to begin to ask questions about the kind of data which 
would be required to address the propositions. This enabled questions to 
be identified which were used to help structure the second interview. 
Interview notes were sent to informants who were asked to comment in 
particular on apparent misrepresentations; this practice was continued 
throughout the study and while it helped build informants' confidence in 
the author (Jones, 1985, 1985a), changes requested were normally very 
minor, concerning details of names, dates and the like.
Both key informants had been closely involved in their respective 
projects; one, as client's project manager (Glaxo) and the other as 
commercial director who, with the chief executive, was involved in 
pre-project planning and in the appointment of consultants and 
contractors. The pattern of progressively more focused interviewing 
described above, where interview material was used to structure and focus 
subsequent interviews was repeated across five interviews with the Glaxo 
informant (each lasting between 1.5 and 6 hours) and four interviews with 
the Vickers informant (each lasting between 1 and 3 hours). Although the 
structure of these interviews was idiosyncratic and related to the 
particular project under review, an underlying common structure was 
obtained by the organisation of questions and interview notes under 
headings relating to groups of propositions.
This initial concentration on single informants was primarily to satisfy 
the requirement noted above that the author become well versed in project 
detail before approaching the informants' colleagues. Not until the first 
five interviews had been completed with the Glaxo informant, and four had 
been completed with the Vickers informant was the author permitted to 
approach other informants within the respective organisations.
While the picture of the project built up from these sources was 
inevitably idiosyncratic, this was alleviated somewhat by the generalist 
perspective offered by both informants. As will be seen, the Glaxo 
informant had a background in chemistry and considerable knowledge of the 
technical and regulatory aspects of antibiotic development and production 
as well as the detail of his own job; the Vickers informant, largely 
because of his seniority, was knowledgeable about the project background
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and the workings of the organisation as well as the detail of the specific 
project. Additionally, during these initial interviews, access was 
provided to project documentation (see below). An examination of this 
allowed checking and confirmation of informants' accounts; the ability to 
link data from different sources in this way permitted more focused 
questioning during subsequent interviews (Fielding and Fielding, 1986).
The majority of subsequent interviews were held with personnel from within 
the client organisations. During fieldwork it was made clear by both 
informants that access to senior management up to board level would be 
difficult, if not impossible to arrange. Interviews were finally 
requested with a further seven individuals in Glaxo, and access was 
granted to five. Interviews were held during 1992 and each lasted between 
1.5 and 3.5 hours. Interviews were requested with a further four people 
in Vickers and access was granted to three. Interviews were held during 
1991 and 1992 and each lasted between 1.5 and 3.5 hours. All of these 
subsequent interviews were tape-recorded.
Towards the end of fieldwork, the Vickers main informant retired; at that 
time access to interview the Vickers Defence Systems chief executive was 
awaited, but despite subsequent requests, an interview was not granted. 
The consultant project manager was also interviewed on the Vickers 
project. A list of the individuals from whom interviews were requested, 
and those with whom interviews were held is presented in Appendix B, 
together with the interview outlines used. These interviews were 
generally more structured and focused on questions of particular relevance 
to that individual's role on the project under review.
4.5.4 Documentary material
Access was provided to project files early in fieldwork. On both projects 
these contained a large amount of information which provided a rich source 
of data allowing corroboration of - and sometimes raising questions about 
- informants' accounts.
Material relating to the Glaxo project was rather more voluminous than the 
Vickers documentation. This included minutes of meetings of project
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working parties, design teams and other ad-hoc groups concerned with the 
Glaxo antibiotic project and the planning and construction of the K2A 
facility. Demand forecasts for the product together with technical 
details of the production process were made available, as were details of 
the construction procurement documentation (drawings, bills of quantities, 
forms of contract and agreement, etc), quantity surveyor's estimates, 
correspondence with construction consultants and contractors, and so on. 
Additionally, informants' handwritten notes of meetings and notes for the 
presentation of project details to superiors were also made available 
where these had been maintained on file. There was a considerable amount 
of documented communications within Glaxo - compared to Vickers - relating 
to the project in the form of memoranda and electronic mail hardcopy. 
Meeting minutes were detailed, frequently amounting to more than 10 pages 
of closely spaced type for each meeting. In general, access was not 
granted to personnel or documentation higher than the Project Team (see 
figure 5.3 in chapter 5 below); however, the capital appropriations 
requests (CARs) submitted to the main Glaxo board in respect of the K2A 
facility were made available.
The Vickers documentation was more directly related to the building 
project and generally comprised minutes of design and progress meetings, 
construction procurement documentation (as for Glaxo), Vickers's internal 
cost reports and quantity surveyor's estimates, correspondence with 
contractors, suppliers and consultants, and so on. The comparative 
absence of documented inter-office communication on the Vickers project 
attested to that project's fewer participants and the reliance those 
participants placed on informal communication. Additionally, there was 
very little in the nature of a documented project pre-history on the 
Vickers project. Access was granted to specific minutes of meetings of 
the main board relating to the building project. As with Glaxo, the CAR 
submitted to the main board in respect of the building project was made 
available.
Other non project-specific internal documents were reviewed relating to 
both organisations' investment approval procedures, technical regulations, 
business performance and structure.
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4.6 METHOD OF REPORTING
During fieldwork, the practice of returning the author's interview notes 
to informants for confirmation and to help avoid misrepresentation was 
followed throughout. The main informants in each firm also agreed to read 
a draft of the case study report and to offer comment (Schatzman and 
Strauss, 1973). Towards the end of 1992 and early in 1993 these drafts 
were ready for Glaxo and Vickers respectively and were sent to the 
informants. Informants in respect of each case declared themselves 
satisfied with the accounts presented and requested only a small number of 
minor modifications. Following the incorporation of these modifications 
and further editing, the final drafts were again sent to the informants 
for comment. In both cases these were returned with further minor 
modifications and drafting suggestions which have been incorporated in the 
versions presented in chapters 5 and 6 below.
The case studies presented in the following chapters are both detailed and 
complicated. They report a great deal of technical, personal and 
organisational information. The view is taken that it is this very 
complexity which is of value to the present study. In the tradition of 
Bower (1970), the cases are presented at two levels of detail 15 . 
First, the projects are described in so far as possible in the language of 
the research site. These descriptions constitute the research data. 
Secondly, to help the reader relate this data to the propositions raised 
in chapter 3 and to provide a preliminary analysis of data as it is 
presented, interpretations of events and actions are provided, largely in 
the language of Bower's model. To distinguish this interpretation within 
the text it is shown in italic typeface. This provides a basis by which 
the cases may be compared in chapter 7 in respect of the study 
propositions.
The investment projects reported in the cases are structured broadly in 
terms of the key processes of resource allocation outlined in chapter 3: 
definition, impetus and implementation. Within this structure, material 
is presented generally in a chronological sequence. However, the projects 
described are substantially different from one another and an identical
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structure for each is inappropriate. As the Vickers case study follows 
the Glaxo study in the order of presentation here, the opportunity is 
taken to compare aspects of the interpretation with that presented in the 
Glaxo case. However, the main inter-case comparison is presented in 
chapter 7.
Finally, at the request of the host firms, the names of individuals 
involved in each case study - including the external contractors, 
suppliers and consultants - have been changed in the accounts which 
follow. The exceptions are the chief executives/chairmen of each host 
firm who are publicly known.
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4.7 FOOTNOTES
1 Mitchell provides a critical, historical perspective on the case 
study tradition in social science (1983, pp!88-190).
2 The fieldwork for this research was carried out between 1990 and 
1992 during which time the author was an associate in a large 
nationally-based construction consultancy. No projects on which 
the author's organisation were engaged were available as case 
studies. Initial approaches made in respect of projects on which 
competitor consultants were employed indicated that access for 
direct, real-time observation in the tradition of Bower (1970), 
King (1975), and Marsh et al (1988) would not be granted 
because of the author's position in a rival consultancy.
3 See for example, Dunkerley (1988) who provides an overview of 
historical methods in organisation analysis together with an 
account of a study using case study methods, document analysis and 
oral histories.
4 Hammersley and Atkinson note that while the study of non-literate 
cultures - with an emphasis on oral history techniques - has been 
the main focus of social anthropology, with more literate cultures 
it is possible to draw on a variety of written accounts which are 
of considerable value to the participant observer (1983, pp!27-9).
5 The discussion in chapter 5 below of the origins of the K2A 
investment project provide an illustration of the difficulty in 
locating project origins.
6 Mitchell argues that the essential point about inferences from case 
material is that they are based on the validity of the analysis and 
cogency of the reasoning rather than on claims to representivity 
(1983; pp!90, 197-200, 207).
7 Yin (1984), p39, 48-9.
8 Access was negotiated between May and December 1990. During that 
period, considerable mass media interest in the operation of a 
number of large UK firms was generated by, inter alia, reports of 
insider dealing in Guinness; the sale of Rover to British Aerospace 
(see Economist, 1989a) and Ferranti's acquisition history (see 
Economist, 1989), for example.
9 Hakim (1987), p64.
10 The Times 1000 ranks firms in order of annual turnover and, while 
some authors have considered large firms with reference to the top 
100 (for example, Channon, 1973; Prais, 1976; Hannah and Kay, 1977; 
Hannah, 1983), others have looked outside of the top 100, for 
example, Nyman and Silberston (1978; top 250), Pike (1983; top 
208), Grant Jamine and Toker (1986; top 304). Any such cut-off is 
essentially arbitrary; there is little difference in turnover
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between the 100th and 101st ranked firms, for example. When 
selection criteria were identified, the 10th and 100th ranked firms 
in the (1988) Times 1000 were separated by a factor of some 6:1, 
whereas a factor of 2.4:1 separated the 100th and 200th ranked 
firms.
11 See, for example, Hill (1988).
12 Bower (1970), pp!8-9.
13 In many standard construction contracts, the issue of the 
certificate of practical completion has considerable contractual 
significance. However, it does not signal the end of construction 
work on site; rather it represents the issuer's opinion that the 
works are complete (Turner, 1983, p65).
14 Crompton and Jones (1988), p72. See also Fielding and Fielding who 
argue that whatever the divisions between quantitative and 
qualitative research:
"..ultimately all methods of data collection are analyzed 
'qualitatively', in so far as the act of analysis is an 
interpretation and therefore, of necessity, a selective 
rendering, of the 'sense' of the available data." (1986, p!2.)
15 See Bower's introduction to case study material, (1970, pp83-4).
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5.1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
This case study is about the role of Glaxo in the decision and 
implementation stages of a capital investment project involving the 
construction of a factory extension (K2A) to an existing manufacturing 
facility (K2 at Glaxo's Barnard Castle site). K2A was built for the 
manufacture of cefuroxime axetil for oral suspension (CAOS). Glaxo had 
been marketing the active ingredient in CAOS (cefuroxime) in tablet and 
injectable forms around the time when the feasibility of producing a 
suspension form, primarily for the paediatric market, was examined.
At that time (towards the end of 1986) however, the precise pharmaceutical 
formulation of the suspension form and the technology for the process of 
its manufacture did not exist within Glaxo. The case study covers the 
period between the end of 1986 and the end of 1990 (when construction work 
on K2A was completed and manufacturing equipment installed). It examines 
Glaxo's role in changes occurring during the construction process caused 
by changes in - inter alia - the product formulation, the 
manufacturing process and the projected market demand for the product.
A brief chronology of key activities is presented in section 5.11 below. 
A list of key personnel featured in this case study is presented in 
section 5.12.
5.2 COMPANY PROFILE 
5.2.1 Introduction
Glaxo Holdings Pic is a research based group of pharmaceutical companies 
with international headquarters in London. In 1986 it operated in 40 
countries and employed around 30,000 people 1 ; by 1990 operations had 
been extended to 50 countries and the total workforce had grown to some 
38,000 people. Although the group's R&D and manufacturing facilities and 
activities have become widely dispersed - in 1990 there were local 
manufacturing facilities in some 30 countries - UK-based R&D and 
production for both UK and international markets employed about 30 per 
cent of the worldwide workforce in 19902.
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The group was ranked 78 in the Times 1000 in 1986-87, and 64 in 1989-90. 
In this period, the group was one of the world's largest and fastest 
growing3 in the pharmaceuticals sector. Glaxo's largest single 
market is now the USA which accounted for some 40 per cent of worldwide 
sales in 1990.
5.2.2 Organisation and structure
The history of Glaxo is one of change prompted by advances in medical and 
pharmaceutical research and, particularly during the 1980s, by an 
increasing focus on the development and manufacture of prescription 
medicines. By the end of the 1970s the company was diversified across a 
wide range of generic drugs, chemicals, baby foods and medical equipment. 
However, during the 1980s and under the leadership of Sir Paul Girolami - 
who became chairman of Glaxo Holdings in 1985 following four years as 
chief executive - Glaxo began to divest itself of its baby food, 
veterinary medicines and medical equipment subsidiaries.
Around the time of these changes the company was becoming more 
geographically diversified, extending operations into Africa, the Middle 
East and Eastern Europe in particular. In 1986, the group was organised 
along the lines of the organisation chart in Figure 5.1 overleaf. Figure 
5.2 outlines the organisation of the principal UK-based operations in that 
year. During 1989 the Group began a substantial internal re-organisation 
to meet the needs of increasing geographic diversification in particular. 
The K2A project was substantially complete by that time and was largely 
unaffected by the re-organisation. It is worth noting however, that one 
of the important changes was the formation of Glaxo Manufacturing Services 
(GMS) to consolidate responsibility for secondary manufacture of 
pharmaceuticals and to provide technical support for Group companies 
worldwide. This had previously been shared between a number of Group 
companies, including Glaxo Production and Engineering Services and the 
secondary manufacturing and production functions of Glaxo Pharmaceuticals 
and Glaxo Export Ltd.
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Figure 5.1: Glaxo Group 1986
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5.2.3 Recent market developments
Glaxo experienced considerable growth in the volume of its pharmaceuticals 
business throughout the 1980s. The company was ranked 21st largest 
pharmaceutical company in the world in 1979, and 2nd largest in 1988. In 
1980, total Group sales and capital expenditure amounted to £618 million 
and £31 million respectively; by 1990 these were £2,570 million and £340 
million4.
This growth has been accompanied by increasing concentration of Group 
activities on prescription medicines. By 1990, almost 90 per cent of 
Group sales were concentrated on pharmaceutical products in three 
therapeutic areas: anti-ulcerants, compounds for respiratory disorders and 
systemic antibiotics. The drug ranitidine - trade name Zantac - accounts 
for almost all Group sales in the anti-ulcerant area and has, since 1989, 
become the world's largest selling prescription medicine5 .
5.3 CAOS: BACKGROUND AND STRATEGY 
5.3.1 Background and origins
Glaxo's early involvement in large scale penicillin production6 has 
helped give the company a leading position in the manufacture of 
antibiotics. The company launched its oral cephalosporin (antibiotic) 
cefuroxime axetil (trade name Zinnat in the UK), a tablet form of the 
injectable drug cefuroxime, in 1988. In its first full year - 1989 - 
sales in all markets accounted for some £100 million, equivalent to about 
25 per cent of all Group sales in the systemic antibiotic area7 .
Prior to this launch, work had been progressing within Glaxo Group 
Research (GGR) on a suspension form of cefuroxime axetil for children, who 
dislike taking tablets. Clive Cannon, a Glaxo pharmacologist (and 
Development Planner on the CAOS project - see below), explained:
'The drug actually tastes very unpleasant, so when we looked at the 
oral suspension development of it, the pharmaceutical strategy was 
to taste mask the drug in order to render it palatable."8
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Glaxo's main competitors in cephalosporins all had suspension forms of 
their leading oral products: Smithkline Beecham had Augmentin and Eli 
Lilly had Ceclor. Furthermore, patent protection on Ceclor in the USA was 
due to expire in 1991. Glaxo Inc's (USA) marketing division had requested 
a suspension form of cefuroxime axetil. It was felt that by launching 
cefuroxime axetil for oral suspension (CAOS), sales of cefuroxime axetil 
could be increased by some 10 per cent to 20 per cent9 . Glaxo Inc 
hoped that CAOS would also, if timed appropriately, capture market share 
before 'generic' manufacturers began to produce low cost Ceclor following 
patent expiry in 1991. (For a brief note on the pharmaceutical industry, 
see Appendix C.)
Note that the business planning context (see 4.3.3 above) was concerned 
with the development of new marketable products in given therapeutic 
areas. Note also that onfy a very small number of research projects ever 
make it to full production (see Appendix. C). The 'taste-mask' version 
of cefuroxime was therefore about to be developed within a planning 
context which had been supportive of earlier forms of the same product.
At that time GGR was responsible for the identification and development of 
new products. Although the origins of CAOS may be traced at least to the 
'discovery' of cefuroxime within GGR, whether market demand for CAOS was 
identified first or whether a research/development 'breakthrough' provided 
a marketing opportunity is not clear. As Cannon explained:
"I think it may have been the people in the department in pharmacy 
division [GGR] who said 'I think we can make a taste-mask version 
of this product'. They may well have done some initial work before 
there was any decision at a senior level to go ahead. But there 
was a perceived need for a paediatric version of this drug because 
the tablets for adults were expected to be very 
successful." 10
This case concentrates on the development of CAOS, rather than its 
discovery. The development of pharmaceutical products involves the 
identification and development of a manufacturing process, its transfer 
from the research laboratory to the production site and the scale-up of 
this process to the full production level. Prior to sale, the product 
must undergo testing for licensing and registration with the appropriate 
regulatory bodies in the markets in which it is to be sold. During this
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time or before, consideration will be given to anticipated market demand 
(for example, how much, where, at what price and when) and the location 
and procurement of the necessary capacity for production, packaging and 
distribution to appropriate markets.
5.3.2 Strategy
The discovery, development, licensing and registration of new drugs takes 
between 10 and 12 years on average. Part of Glaxo's competitive advantage 
is to bring products to market quickly (see Appendix C). Tony Spackman 
(Glaxo Pharmaceuticals technologist - see below), explained:
"What in effect happens is that in order to have a compressed 
timescale of, say, 7 years, a lot of things go on in parallel. 
Industry averages seem to be about ten or eleven. We tend to do it 
in seven or eight. If you wait three or four years to get it 
right, you've missed it. Putting in manpower to sort out the 
problems is a small cost relative to the revenue lost for not 
getting on the market." 11
With CAOS, GGR were developing a new form of an existing product, and 
therefore hoped to utilise a good deal of the effort already expended in 
the testing, licensing and registration of cefuroxime. The intention was 
to demonstrate 'bio-equivalence' between the new suspension and the tablet 
which had already been registered in major markets. Cannon explained:
"...in other words if you took 250mg of the suspension it would 
produce the same blood levels as a 250mg tablet. Had we been able 
to do that, we would have been able to rely on all of the clinical 
data... we had already gone through that process with the 
tablet." 12
This strategy required an overlap of process development and product 
registration, both of which are closely interrelated (see Appendix C). As 
will be seen, uncertainties over the production process delayed the 
production of documentation and CAOS samples for registration causing 
anticipated launch dates in major markets to be revised.
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5.4 EARLY DEVELOPMENTS
5.4.1 Introduction and overview
Between examining the feasibility of producing CAOS, and identifying the 
need for a factory to produce it (K2A, which is the focus of this case), a 
good deal of decision making took place. It is important to describe some 
of this activity for it contains the origins of the 'discrepancy' leading 
to the definition of K2A which, as will be seen, were located deep within 
the organisation. Secondly, discussion of these early decisions 
introduces some of the individuals and groups involved, and establishes 
the procedural and organisational context within which they operated. 
Thirdly, it introduces a number of key themes concerning uncertainty about 
market demand and process technology which dominate the process of 
facility definition in particular.
The organisational structure for the administration of the project - 
including Glaxo's eventual role in the construction process - was 
established quickly as a matter of some routine. As will be seen, the 
early stages of this investment project were dominated by questions of 
where to locate production. Although not the subject of the present 
study, the process by which this appears to have been resolved - with 
different Glaxo Group companies effectively competing for the investment 
project - appears somewhat removed from the notion of rational choice 
based on full information (see chapter 2), and also helps set the scene 
for what follows.
5.4.2 The formation of the Project Task Group (Dec. 1986)
The feasibility studies for the production of CAOS, carried out within 
Glaxo Group Research (GGR) Pharmacy Division during 1986, identified two 
key processes. The primary process involved coating individual active 
drug particles with wax as a taste-mask. The secondary process involved 
blending the coated particles with powdered sugar and flavouring. This 
blended mixture is then granulated and dried to produce a powdery granule 
which gives a flavoured suspension on re-constitution with water.
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At that time, John Parker was director of GGR's Pharmacy division and was, 
as will be seen, particularly interested in this product. One of the 
first formal steps in new product development was the formation of a 
Project Task Group to oversee the development process. This would 
normally involve those companies which would be responsible for production 
and would also contain representatives from departments responsible for 
'front-end' activities such as process development and registration. On 
11 December 1986, Parker announced to colleagues that "we are close to 
having a product" 13 and set about forming a Project Task Group.
Although responsibilities had not been defined, Parker contacted 
colleagues in Glaxochem, who would probably be responsible for primary 
production; Glaxo Pharmaceuticals, who would be responsible for secondary 
production if this was to be located in the UK; and Glaxo Inc (USA), who 
had been instrumental in identifying the product's market potential, and 
who were also keen to manufacture the product for sale in the USA.
Task Group membership is shown in Figure 5.3a below. The first meeting on 
23 December 1986 is significant in that the need for new facilities was 
identified. Underwood, the Glaxo Pharmaceuticals Technical Development 
Division (TDD) representative, noted that if production was to be located 
in the UK (at Glaxo Operations Barnard Castle site), new facilities would 
have to be built and equipped. Samuelson (representing Glaxo Inc) 
indicated that Glaxo Inc were contemplating building dedicated facilities 
in the USA. Preliminary market forecasts presented at the meeting 
indicated that 5 tonnes of coated active drug would be required in the 
first year of launch rising to 45 tonnes by the 3rd year. "For a good 
product", the meeting minutes note, "the year 3 forecasts could be 
doubled" 14. The meeting also considered the question of how the 
product was to be packaged 15 - an issue which was to prove 
problematic later in the project - and indicated a preference for high 
density polyethylene (HDPE) bottles.
The need for a new facility has been identified by Underwood, a 
facility-oriented' manager, in terms of a discrepancy between available 
capacity and that likely to be required. Note also Glaxo Inc's desire to
108
be considered as a candidate production site which, as will be seen, 
develops into a 'bid' for 'ownership' of production for their own market. 
However, there was uncertainty over the market forecasts (for the USA only 
and subject to a wide error margin) and over pack options, and there was 
no mention at this stage of an overall timescale.
5.4.3 Progress with facility definition (Jan. 1987)
In January 1987 Parker instructed Underwood to examine the definition of a 
facility for CAOS production. Underwood presented details of the 
production facility at the next meeting of the Task Group on 9 February 
1987. His written report provides the first formal definition of both 
the process and the production facilities. Underwood's report notes:
"Because of the uncertainty in process detail we have designed a 
building based upon a portal frame structure, in which there would 
be no internal columns. ...we have derived a facilities design 
which requires a building shell of approximately 60 metres by 40, 
with an internal height of not less than 11 metres."
Construction facilities were estimated to cost between £12.9m and £13.4m, 
depending on the infrastructure provision at the chosen site. The meeting 
minutes note that the facility could be built in either the UK or the USA 
and that:
"the major decision rests on which site could complete the facility 
the fastest". 17
Rapid progress had been made by Underwood throughout January in the 
definition of a new facility in terms of size and cost. The extent of 
this appears surprising, given uncertainties over market demand (no new 
forecasts of market demand had been provided since the December meeting), 
process and packs. However, it would appear that Glaxo Pharmaceuticals 
(as well as Glaxo Inc) were keen to be involved in the manufacture of this 
product, and this may help explain Underwood's detailed and, as will be 
seen, somewhat premature facility definition. It is worthwile noting that 
at this point, no mention of 'aggregate financial' considerations such as 
return on investment had been made in Task Group meetings.
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Figure 5.3a: The CAOS/K2A project structure
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-USA Representative (D Samuelson   Glaxo Inc)
 GGR Development planning:
(A Dockery - GGR; to Sept 1988)
(B Gillespie - GGR; Sept 1988 to Nov 1989)
(C Cannon - GGR; Nov 1989 to July 1990)
-Primary process development (C Robins - Glaxochem)
 Secondary process development:
(P Street - GGR) 
(PHeadwood-GGR)
  Marketing development/forecasting
(G Leigh - Glaxo Holdings) 
(J Starkey - Glaxo Holdings)
 Technology transfer:
(K Chessman - G Phanns/TDD) 
(T Spackman - G Phanns/TDD)
 Resource planning (M Nathan   Glaxo Operations)
-Regulatory and approvals (A Wiggs - GGR)
-USA Representative:
(D Samuelson   Glaxo Inc) 
(J Hakim - Glaxo Inc)
-Italy Representative(V Perotti - Glaxo Italy)
-FACILITIES PROJECT MANAGEMENT:
(S Hatfield - Glaxo Operations) 
(J Laxton - Glaxo Operations)
-Secretary:
(B Gillespie - GGR; Sept 1988 to Nov 1989) 
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(D German - GGR)
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(E Butler - GPES)
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-FACILITIES PROJECT MANAGEMENT:
(SHat6eld - Glaxo Operations)
110
Ip*
111



inter 
alia, 
The period since April 1987 is a critical period in the clarification of 
production intentions and in the definition of facilities. Note that 
until early June, the definition of facilities had not progressed at all 
since Underwood's proposal of January. In fact, that definition is now 
irrelevant. The location of production has been the main focus of 
attention. (Although access was not granted to GTC meetings or minutes, 
it is clear that there was considerable competition between Glaxo Inc and 
Glaxo Pharmaceuticals for the location of production.)
Revised arrangements for the production of launch stocks have forced 
Hatfield - a "facility oriented' (project) manager - to think about the 
implications for Barnard Castle. He enlists more senior help (Chandler) 
to help clarify both the GTC intentions for the location of production. 
His job allows him to raise the more strategic issue of the possible long 
term role for Barnard Castle in CAOS production. Note also the impetus 
provided by Chandler in his indication that "a proposal in respect of 
Barnard Castle facilities was expected.

The project had now become considerably more complex than had been 
envisaged when Parker formed the first task group. Confirmation that 
bio-equivalence had not been established meant a tougher, lengthier and 
costlier registration process with consequential delays to the launch in 
the USA in particular; new market information indicated uncertainties over 
the range of pack types and sizes; problems with the production process 
had not yet been resolved; and there were still no hard data on the likely 
volumes of secondary product which would be required. In this context the 
facility definition tabled by Underwood in January appears particularly 
premature. Note also that it is Glaxo companies in the individual markets 
who are providing market information - a particular problem facing this 
large geographically diversified firm was the management and co-ordination 
of this activity.
inter 
alia, 
The increasing focus on Barnard Castle combined with upward revisions in 
the market forecasts and a clearer indication of what these meant in 
production and capacity terms had led Hatfield and his colleagues - all 
concerned with facility and capacity planning - to identify the need for a
new facility (K2A). Note that they defined the facility in capacity and 
capital cost terms; the information available to them was considerably 
more detailed than what was available to Underwood some 10 Months before, 
but their definition was more tentative. Although as will be seen, the 
development of CAOS involved a number of production 'projects', from now 
on the focus for this case is increasingly the K2A construction project.
Agreement at project team meetings that considerable investment is 
required may be viewed as a form of impetus very early in the definition 
process. The definition process was now dividing in two - the activities 
at the production site (K, C, and a possible extension to K2) where Glaxo 
OperationsIPharmaceuticals personnel were primarily concerned with 
facility definition and the 'operational' detail of getting the product to 
market; and the activities of the Project Team, where the 'project' 
continued to be defined in its widest terms - primary and secondary 
process development, location of production, filling and packs, market 
forecasts, clinical trials and registration, alternative formulations, and 
so on. However, largely because of uncertainties over launch dates and 
volumes in major markets, there would appear to have been no central 
timetable for the planning and co-ordination of these different activities 
associated with definition.

This is a critical period in both the definition and impetus phases for 
K2A - note that the discrepancy between available and required capacity 
appeared unmistakable, and that Hatfield had clarified the facility 
definition in both capacity and cost terms. Further, the market forecasts 
indicated a substantial demand in 1990; Hatfield felt that approval of 
funding for a major project would be required urgently if the building was 
to be designed, built, commissioned, validated and in production in time. 
He had identified alternative approaches to meeting the forecast demand, 
all of which required substantial capital investment and had therefore 
pushed Murray to consider the likelihood of capital investment in a 'major 
project'. Murray lent support to the project without affecting Hatfield's 
definition by saying much the same to Chandler, the effect of which was to 
give the project further impetus.

Murray's continuing support of Hatfield's proposal and his 'innocent' 
enquiry of Chandler helped generate further impetus (both men, after all, 
are in the formal authorisation chain - see below). Nathan's 
recommendation to Chandler was more of an 'independent' confirmation of 
what (the more partial) Hatfield and Murray were proposing, and 
consequently was of considerable value in both defining what was needed 
and in providing impetus to the proposal Hatfield's proposal for a fast 
track' approach promised to generate tangible financial commitment to the 
project in advance of full authorisation by the Group board.
Although the 20 November meeting heard that capital investment of some 
£3m-£4m may be required, a budget was established by Hatfield of some £5m 
(including manufacturing equipment - see the K2A Cost Estimates table, 
Appendix D.5) and this was included in Glaxo Pharmaceuticals' five year 
plan of 1988189.
By mid-summer 1988 the earlier momentum which had forced the pace of 
project definition had slowed considerably. The revision to launch dates, 
particularly in the USA, had given all project teams some breathing 
space. However, it meant that other possible production sites could again 
be considered and raised doubts over proposals for K2A. Additionally, 
other uncertainties regarding packs and formulation changes were 
continuing to divert the Project Team's attention away from production 
issues.
Although the GTC had requested proposals for a 350tpa installation at 
Barnard Castle, Clarke's questioning of whether this was sufficient
resulted in the Barnard Castle team arguing that a larger installation was 
needed for the company's 'strategic' needs. Note also that the 
possibility of an extension to K2A (itself an extension to K2) has been 
identified. Clarke's intervention also helped clarify the definition of 
K2A.
The extent of the problem of identifying market demand needs to be 
clarified. The marketing division were attempting to obtain information 
on expected registration and launch dates, sales volumes and pack 
preferences in up to 30 culturally diverse markets, for a product the 
precise pharmaceutical form of which was unknown. The problem for those 
involved in facility definition was that changes in launch dates and sales 
volumes, as well as changes in the secondary production process, made the 
definition of the facility very difficult. Although attempts were being 
made to progress a range of development activities in parallel: facility 
definition, market forecasting and registration planning; all interacted 
with process development. There does not appear to have been a strong 
central timetable for this which would have helped in the management of 
all development activities.
Recent progress has confirmed the definition of K2A centred on a 1000kg 
granulation plant; note, however, the increasing complexity of the context 
in which the definition process was taking place, relating to a number of 
construction projects at Barnard Castle (as well as facility definition in 
both the USA and Italy). In the two years since Parker formed the first 
Task Group with the announcement "we are close to having a product", K2A 
had still not been defined in the kind of detail presented by Underwood in 
January 1987. Note also that considerable time and effort - which 
included outside consultants' time - had by this time been spent on the 
definition of K2A (and related projects); the project was now defined in 
some detail in terms of size, accommodation, cost and time of 
availability.


Note the extent to which facility definition had progressed, both in terms 
of time - almost two years since Underwood's initial definition - and in 
terms of detailed requirements, prior to construction involvement.
A number of factors may be identified here as contributing impetus; the 
formal inclusion of K2A in Glaxo Pharmaceuticals' capital programme; 
confirmation that a Board paper was expected; Cargill's efforts to ensure 
that sufficient funding was obtained to provide a satisfactory facility.
6 

Note that the fast-track' approach was defined primarily in terms of the 
approval of expenditure. Depending on the project duration and the time 
taken for Group Board approval, a fast-track approach such as this could, 
in theory, commit considerable expenditure in advance of formal top 
management approval The point here, however, is that the expectation 
that approval would be forthcoming combined with the commitment generated 
by advance expenditure, contributed considerable impetus to the K2A 
project. Clearly, the investment 'context' permitted - and, indeed, 
encouraged - this; recall Glaxo's reputation for bringing products to 
market quickly and Nathan's comments about "time compression in the 
development phase" (Appendix C).
The formation of the TWP may be seen in terms of a change to structural 
context and, while the source of this change does not appear to be at the 
top management level, it nevertheless arose out of the need for a 
co-ordinating function for a number of new product development 
activities. Specifically, previous commentary (sections and 
in particular) has identified a lack of co-ordination between process 
development, registration planning and market forecasting. The TWP, with 
its emphasis on co-ordination and representation from GGR (regulatory, 
development planning, pharmacy - process development), the manufacturing 
site, International Marketing Division, and TDD, is a direct response to 
this.

The main argument presented in the DP - and reinforced in Nathan's 
'strategic' summary - is that the investment is necessary to provide new 
capacity to meet anticipated demand. It is written by facility-oriented 
managers and, although phrased in terms of capacity and facilities, it 
considers the proposed provision of UK facilities in the context of 
product demand and existing (and planned) Group facilities worldwide. In 
capacity terms, then, it may be said to take account of corporate level 
needs and concerns.
Project definition up to this point appears to have taken place within a 
'business planning context' (see 4.3.3 above) set by top management 
wherein the market and the product (CAOS) to be sold in it have already 
been identified. Although this proposal arose from within Glaxo 
Pharmaceutical, there are clear indications that top management 
encouraged the submission of a bid for capital investment funds for this 
product. For example, neither Nathan (nor Hatfield as principal author) 
mention return on investment (ROI) in the DP. Further, the calculation 
and presentation of the financial justification for the investment appears 
routine, parochial ("not justified from a Glaxo Pharmaceuticals 
viewpoint") and, ultimately, irrelevant. The history of cost 
escalation66 without apparent reference to ROI criteria at company 
or Group level suggests that capital costs were not a primary 
consideration.
However, within this business planning context, an 'integrating level' 
process of "sounding out" has helped to confirm "what the corporation 
wants of me' (see also Murray's 'assumption' in an earlier memo to 
Chandler that the project stood a reasonable chance of authorisation, 
section 5.5.4).
The formal procedure for the approval of pre-spends explicitly 
acknowledges the risk involved, ie, it is clear that the worth of the 
expenditure is dependent upon approval of the main DP. By approving these 
pre-spends, managers commit themselves and the resources within their 
control to the larger project. It is unlikely that they would do this 
without some indication that the main DP was likely to be approved. In 
doing so, however, the risk of "writing off' pre-spend expenditure passes 
to top management who may then find it difficult to reject proposals to 
which a good deal of the corporation's human and financial resources are 
already committed.

The process of impetus for the K2A DP can now be summarised and 
clarified. First, there was an expectation by top management that a 
proposal was being submitted and a prior knowledge of what it contained. 
Secondly, there was a considerable level of financial commitment already 
made (and about to be made) in the form of expenditure on product and 
process development and pre-spends authorised by those managers who were 
also in the authorisation chain for the main DP. And thirdly, there was 
support from the Strategic Planning Unit for the creation of worldwide 
capacity for this product.

money.
Note that the origin of the change lies in the 'insecurity' of a director 
whose responsibilities are facility-oriented, even if he had not been 
involved much in the detail of project definition. Further, he was 
supported by Parker who, as chairman of the Project Team and a 
considerable source of project momentum up to that point, contributed the 
necessary impetus.
Despite indications that significant additional costs might be needed, 
there was reluctance to sanction this financial change. Although
informants were somewhat reluctant to discuss the financial aspects of 
this change in much detail, it raises a number of questions. In 
particular, it was not possible to examine the extent to which such cost 
increases might have reflected poorly on managerial competence and, 
further, whether the implications of this would have been greater the 
higher up the hierarchy was the particular manager concerned. Indeed, it 
would appear that consequential cost increases were, in this case, 
directly attributable to the individual initiating the change.
It would appear then, that while the technical content of the proposal 
could be altered at the eleventh hour, there was more reluctance to alter 
its financial content. (As will be seen, additional costs were, in fact, 
partly absorbed into cost increases required as a result of a later 
change.) However, at that time Hatfield appears to have had little choice 
but to insist to the design team that the budget remain unchanged. There 
was still a considerable amount of design development work left to do on 
the K2A building. Furthermore, in addition to a 2.5 per cent contingency 
on project costs (including equipment costs and professional fees), the 
£7.8m requested in the DP was permitted to fluctuate within a limit of ±15 
per cent.
Contrast the more 'top-down' nature of the fallow area change, which 
concerns the provision of capacity for Group needs, with the more 
'bottom-up' process of changing the batch plant, which is a more detailed 
technical change, though closely related to meeting market demand.
Hatfield recalled19 his determination not to allow work on the 
fallow area to interfere with progress on the main contract for K2A. He 
pointed out that the main contractor was allowed to work on the fallow 
area in parallel with work under the main contract on this understanding. 
When asked how this was handled contractually, he replied: "We just told 
him." There was no separate agreement for the fallow area, nor was there 
any particular requirement in the architect's instruction to say that the 
main contract took precedence.
If the search here was for neat theory relating the size and costs of 
production facilities directly to the demand for the products to be 
produced in them, it is very difficult to see how the origin and 
management of both of the changes reported here could be accommodated 
within it. Neither can such behaviour be explained solely in terms of 
narrow self interest; the readiness with which Glaxo Pharmaceuticals 
appear prepared to develop a production capability for this product has an 
element of (at least) company-level strategy about it. The willingness 
and the ability of relatively senior management to intervene in the 
facility definition process is further indication of an investment process 
spread across many levels of the corporation's hierarchy.
The lack of explicit financial justification for the fallow area 
investment is notable; as Hatfield remarked, the need for "insurance 
against the forecasts being too" low would appear to have been given 
further support by the revised forecasts at the beginning of August. In 
these terms, the need for investment is more concerned with the potential 
loss of market share than the financial return anticipated.


Note that Murray, whose responsibilities cover all manufacturing at the 
Barnard Castle site, identified an urgent need for the planning and 
co-ordination of secondary manufacturing for this product. This led 
directly to a change to 'structural context' with the appointment of 
Frosini to a planning and co-ordination role.

Although Hatfield stressed to colleagues at the end of August that "Laxton 
is the overall project manager", Hatfield was still prepared to become 
involved in key decisions (eg the selection of the main contractor). 
Laxton, by contrast, was around this time more directly involved in 
detailed matters of construction.
By 'selling' the idea of negotiation to Healey, Hatfield was reconciling 
the needs of the project - completion on time - with the needs of the 
corporation - demonstrating that costs are competitive. In this 
'integrating level' activity may be seen the beginnings of a form of 
'determination of context'. Recall proposition I; the context at issue 
here is that set of agreements which determine the relationship between 
client and contractor. Negotiating to secure agreement with a known and 
trusted contractor in this instance appears to have helped relax the 
formal agreement between them: "we just told him" not to let Fallow Area 
work interfere with the main contract.

26 
There appears to have been no overall co-ordination of forecasts of sales 
volumes and launch dates, at least until Frosini involved Customer 
Services in November 1989. Also, Leigh's request for a "boldly optimistic 
forecast" may have encouraged markets to overstate their requirements. 
Hatfield thought that the problems experienced with this product were part 
of the "normal uncertainties" associated with a new product launch. 
However, he noted that responsibility for forecasts of volumes and launch 
dates now rests with "a single group" within Glaxo Manufacturing 
Services9^.
The revisions to demand forecasts in February - indicating a postponement 
of peak demand - tended to relax the constraints on the timing of K2A 
construction work. The 10 week delay does not seem to be as critical as 
it might have appeared a few months earlier. Note the extent of Glaxo 
involvement, however, and the extent to which it was seen appropriate to 
revise some aspects of 'structural context' - programmes and meeting 
arrangements.
this.
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Note that the management of the Group (as well as of the Division) were 
aware of the high costs of operating in the existing facility. As will be 
seen, the need for a new facility is identified partly in terms of a 
discrepancy between current and potential operating costs.
6.3.2 1980 - Changes at the top

Goold and Campbell (1987) argue that in Strategic Control companies, 
radical initiatives involving business closure are more likely to come 
from the centre than from the businesses. They argue further that an 
important corporate role is the allocation of managerial 
resources1*. Taken together, these propositions pose a dilemma for 
the interpretation of Blackmore's appointment: was he appointed to review 
the business or - on behalf of corporate management - to close it down? 
His previously successful "rescue' efforts are perhaps significant; 
Willis, who indicated that Blackmore was the "right man for the job" 
added, when questioned further, that "there was nothing sinister in his 
appointment" 14. Notwithstanding the subsequent history, the 
interpretation then is that corporate management viewed the Defence 
Systems division as one with growth and profit potential and appointed 
Blackmore to identify how best this could be exploited.
6.4.2 Prologue: The Michell project


Although the 'discrepancy' triggering facility definition can be 
identified in terms of costs, this does not fully describe the initiating 
phase of the definition process. Blackmore's prior belief in the value of
new facilities in helping to achieve the radical re-organisation of the 
business he felt was necessary is fundamental. Only by physically moving 
operations out of the Elswick works could the working practices, 
structures and inbuilt inefficiencies which had become so intertwined with 
the existing facility be changed. Arguably, the discrepancy concerned 
structural context as well as costs. Note that there is no mention of a 
discrepancy in capacity terms (as on K2A); note also that Blackmore, as 
the source of definition, could not be considered a facility-oriented' 
manager in the 'Bower'sense.

Although informants spoke of Blackmore's belief in the value of the 
benefits of a new facility, it would appear that such belief, whilst 
apparently strongly held, did not on its own provide sufficient 
justification to top management for major capital investment. Indeed, it 
will be seen that no attempt was made to place a financial value on many 
of the benefits identified; perhaps this was because the comparison of 
operating costs 'before and after' provided such a powerful case on its 
own for capital investment. In the event, the case for investment was 
made in the kinds of financial terms which top management can be expected 
to understand and to act on. This is not to imply that there was a 
'hidden agenda', but simply to note that there were factors in the 
decision to invest other than those that were measured financially in the 
CAR.


There are a number of important observations which may be made here on the 
definition process which differs markedly from that reported on the K2A 
project. First, the extent to which senior management were involved in 
both the initiating and integrating phases of definition appears much 
greater on Dreadnought. Whereas top management were involved in K2A in 
setting the business planning context within which products requiring 
investment emerged from the research company, their role appears more 
direct and deliberate in this case. To a large extent top management have 
identified the discrepancy ('something needs to be done'); the involvement 
of facility-oriented managers lower down the hierarchy in this activity is 
barely discernible. However, "everybody knew there was a potential 
crisis" according to Willis, and this rather widespread knowledge may have 
contributed to the identification of the discrepancy leading to 
Blackmore's appointment.
Secondly, the approach to sizing the new facility, without reference to 
specific market forecasts, was very different from K2A. For Dreadnought, 
the factory was sized with reference to the maximum throughput likely to 
occur, and the historic need to accommodate a double order. Although both 
the K2A and Dreadnought facility definitions are uncertain, each relates 
to its individual industry needs. The Dreadnought definition was (as will 
be seen) geared more towards accommodating likely fluctuations in 
throughput in the longer term.
Thirdly, the production process and technology were well known with 
Dreadnought and the definition process was consequently more 
straightforward than on K2A. Although Dreadnought - because of site 
constraints - required a re-organisation of production, the machinery and 
production operations to be accommodated were well known.
Fourthly, compared to K2A, the definition process on this project has 
taken a very short time. A proposition arises. It is that the higher the
managerial level at which projects get defined, the faster they will move 
toward funding. However, speed of definition in this case has an 
additional element associated with it; recall that Blackmore wanted to 
complete his review before he became "too close" to the business. His 
seniority and authority allowed him to force the pace and there is a sense 
in which he generated his own impetus (see section 7.3 below).
Finally, the dominant industry consideration affecting the K2A definition 
process may be said to be Glaxo's position of competitive advantage in the 
development of new pharmaceutical products. Their strategy of bringing 
products to market quickly, and the consequences of parallel working for 
activities of process development, registration and facility design and 
acquisition had a strong influence on the way in which the definition 
process was initiated and managed. By contrast, the dominant industry 
characteristic affecting the definition process on this project would 
appear to be the long production cycle and the low volume/long term nature 
of orders. In summary, Glaxo manufacture to sell a large volume of 
product into a variety of markets simultaneously; Vlckers manufacture low 
volumes to order.

CAR. 

Informants queried about the capital approvals procedure emphasised the 
importance of informal discussion prior to the formal submission of a 
CAR. They indicated that the support of higher level managers was 
important in helping generate impetus, but that Blackmore had already had 
the support of Plastow, which practically guaranteed approval. The role 
of top management, in effectively initiating the project - with the 
appointment of Blackmore - and in supporting Blackmore's application for 
funding would appear to go beyond the process of 'determination of 
context' to which they are largely confined in Bower's analysis.
Hammond's earlier comment that "the downside risk of a new facility was 
low" is the essence of the financial case Blackmore presented. The 
savings in operating costs - or, rather, for the 'downside' scenario, the 
reduction in loss - on a nil vehicle throughput for two years were some 
£3m-£3.5m per annum. If the business was unable to raise new orders after 
this, the new facility could be sold at a loss, but the net loss was 
considerably less than remaining at Elswick. However, the new facility 
would give the division the capability to respond to a potential 'double 
order' and with considerably reduced operating costs.
Note however, that the time horizon over which the financial case is made 
is very short (4 years; to 1985) and that the case is made in terms of net 
cash flow over the period - there is no mention of return on investment 
(ROI).
Once 
"l l/z 
This is not inconsistent with the commentary on section 6.5.3 above on the 
importance of the top management role. It has already been noted that top 
management were involved in Blachnore's appointment and that they were 
kept informed of his developing proposals. It is hardly surprising, then, 
that they did not contribute directly to detailed formulation of the 
investment proposal nor that they did not alter it following Blachnore's 
formal submission.
Blachnore's personal dominance of both the definition and impetus 
processes poses a number of questions for Bower's model as a useful 
framework for the description of events thus far. Although the 
initiating, integrating and corporate phases of the processes appear 
discernible, they do not appear to be spread across the management 
hierarchy to the extent as implied in the model (nor, indeed, as reported 
on K2A). The implication is that the integrating-phase task may be, to a 
large extent, unnecessary here. The role of top management and the 
proximity of Blackmore - as the main agent of project definition - to 
them perhaps signals a lack of differentiation between the initiating and 
corporate level phases of project definition and impetus.
Another proposition arises here. It is that where resource allocation is 
more of a 'top-down' process, the need for integrating managers in the 
definition and impetus processes is reduced, compared to where resource 
allocation is more 'bottom-up'. Although top management did not initiate 
the Dreadnought project directly, it is very likely that they expected an 
investment proposal following Blachnore's appointment. Furthermore, the
speed with which Blackmore acted to formulate a proposal served to 
capitalise on this involvement by maintaining the impetus already provided 
and, indeed, generating further impetus.
Note the overlap of implementation with definition/impetus: Blackmore 
appointed Wright Bates as project managers - subject, of course to the 
project progressing - in advance of funding approval This agreement is 
specific (for this project) and it delegated considerable authority to 
Wright Bates to act on Vickers behalf. Although it may be viewed as a 
temporary form of 'structural context' between Vickers and Wright Bates, 
it was drafted initially by Wright Bates. In any event, the close working 
relationship which had been developing between Blackmore and Nicholson up 
to that point was rather more important than the contractual agreement 
between them.
C 
V)

The possibility that change may be required to the size of the building as 
defined in the CAR was effectively precluded by Blackmore, first in his 
sizing of the building to accommodate an unprecedented throughput, and 
secondly, in his determination to complete construction work within the 
one year 'Dreadnought'timescale.
Once the size and structure of the workforce and production systems had 
been determined and the site selected, the problem of definition for 
facility-oriented managers (like Carlton in particular) was not a matter 
of whether enough space was available, but how to accommodate the 
necessary processes within the pre-determined space.
The source of redefinition in respect of the office accommodation lies in 
a discrepancy ('quality - of accommodation - is inadequate') identified by 
Nicholson. Although the argument contains statements about the benefits 
of integrating the workforce, the case on which a decision is requested - 
as in the case of Blackmore's investment proposal to the Executive 
Committee - is made in financial terms.

Many of the practical problems of building the new facility on this site 
had to be addressed early in the facility definition process because of 
the tight timescale imposed by Blackmore. In particular, the need for 
machine base criteria to be issued to tendering contractors before the 
factory layout had been decided complicated the issue of machine base 
design. Further, although Blackmore's apparent need for cost and risk 
minimisation is hardly surprising, it is important to note how his 
interest in the risk/trade-off equation was given expression in the 
specification and made an element of the competitive tendering process. 
Although proposition I concerns the extent to which construction clients 
may determine a form of structural context between the firm and 
construction firms to enable change to be managed, Blackmore appears to 
have been able to 'determine context'fora very different reason.
Note that detailed preparations for construction and design development 
were progressing prior to funding approval by the Executive Committee on 
10 March. The definition process was now involving additional Vickers's 
personnel, but note the authority of Blackmore and Nicholson as 
'arbitrators' as to what could be accommodated. Nicholson's early 
attention to the problem of heavy machine bases is indicative of his 
understanding of the need to keep project costs within the limit 
established in the CAR.
Note Blackmore's preoccupation with the project timescale - his position 
and authority allow him to make comments on the demolition contract to 
which he is not a party - and his expression of the effects of not 
adhering to this in financial terms. The previously calculated saving in 
operating costs (£3m per annum) equates to £0.25m per month.


The YDS approach to procurement may be contrasted with Glaxo's on K2A. On 
K2A the emphasis was on negotiation to 'buy' co-operation in the event of 
change and disruption. On Dreadnought there was an emphasis on the 
allocation of risk to tendering contractors in respect of those aspects of 
the work which could not be clearly defined in advance. This contrast is 
examined further in the next chapter.
Although some consideration was given (by Vickers's legal department) to 
the contract form proposed, this did not result in any project-specific 
requirements and the extent to which the proposed contract documentation 
was designed to determine a unique form of 'structural context' between 
Vickers and the main contractor was limited. More significant was the 
level of liquidated and ascertained damages determined by Blackmore to 
help ensure that the project timescale and budget was adhered to. Wright 
Bates's (complementary) preoccupation with the design capability of main 
contractors as a factor in their selection was also relevant to help 
ensure compliance with the project timescale and cost, as was Willis's 
financial 'vetting' of potential sub-contractors and contractors.



is hardly surprising that project management and control procedures may 
be created to assist client objectives concerning time and cost. However, 
the project management and cost control procedures Nicholson had devised 
were an important mechanism enabling resource allocation to take place 
during the construction phase. Although it would appear that resources 
had already been allocated, in that the quantum of funding available had 
been determined, there remained the task of allocating this available 
funding across the different accommodation needs of the business as the 
design developed. This required information on what was practically and 
financially achievable; more than that, it needed a mechanism whereby the 
'client' could intervene in the construction process if necessary. The 
observation of interest here is that mechanisms for information (cost 
reporting - see below) and intervention (Els) were explicitly related to 
the ongoing process of resource allocation. This form of 'structural 
context' was under the control of the client: note the invocation by 
Nicholson of Blackmore as higher authority to insist that the management 
and control procedures proposed be adopted despite the contractor's 
disquiet.
Nicholson's 'existing building' analogy is a reminder that no major change 
to the scope of the building was envisaged. The minuted exchange between 
Deacon and Nicholson is indicative of much of the formal meeting minutes 
relating to project and progress meetings. These minutes were prepared by 
Wright Bates and, on issues of dispute, have a tendency to outline the 
contractual position or to attempt to speak on behalf of YDS.

inter alia, 
Blackmore's intervention again - as in the establishment of management and 
cost control procedures (see commentary on section 6.7.4 above) - was 
critical in ensuring that the need to keep costs within budget was met. 
This was achieved by a combination of authority and threat; despite 
Nicholson's considerable authority to act on Vickers's behalf in dealing 
with the contractor, these weapons were not available to him. Note that 
Blackmore also invoked a higher authority - the Vickers Main Board - to 
say that no more funding was available.
Nicholson acted to adjust 'structural context' in an attempt to avoid 
subsequent disputes. Note that these aspects of 'context' - meeting 
arrangements and the like - did not require contractual alterations and 
were, in this case, capable of being determined by Nicholson, the client's 
agent.


Blackmore's 'intervention' in the construction process has already been 
noted in respect of the imposition of management and control arrangements 
and the resolution of potential contractor's claims. These interventions 
may be termed 'critical' in that Blachnore's power and authority were 
required to clear an impasse which could not be resolved by either 
Nicholson or any of the other of Vickers's personnel involved. The offer 
of a bonus to the main contractor to regain time lost due to inclement 
weather was also in this 'critical' category.
But Blackmore - and VDS - participated more in 'routine' construction 
matters less related to crises requiring authoritative intervention. This 
involvement was not limited to what might normally be expected of a 
construction client on this kind of design and build contract. In 
particular, a number of key materials and components were either purchased 
directly or manufactured by VDS for incorporation into the works by the 
contractor. Although it would be reasonable to expect VDS's direct 
involvement in the purchase of overhead and jib cranes and in the 
arrangements for the machine tool move, the same cannot be said of their 
direct purchase of cladding. This latter purchase is understandable, but 
the rationale - unlike the purchase of cranes and the machine move - had 
little to do with their detailed knowledge of production needs.
Of more interest here, however, is the use of spare manufacturing capacity 
to supply components to the works. Although ostensibly a cost-saving 
measure, this did little to reduce costs but its effect on involving the 
workforce directly in the project should not be missed. Nicholson spoke 
of the "fund of Geordie goodwill" which he believes his team tapped; 
Blackmore in the CAR wrote about his concern to avoid a "rearguard action 
by the workforce" to thwart his plans. This is important; the level in 
the firm's hierarchy at which this project originated meant that, as well 
as securing top management funding approval, Blackmore needed to secure 
the 'approval' of the VDS management and workforce if the project was to 
proceed. Although the VDS management were involved in preparations for 
the move from Elswick, the line workforce were largely excluded.
In summary, the extent of VDS involvement in the construction process - 
all channelled through Blackmore - was considerable. This involvement 
included detailed decisions about layout and the provision of machine data 
for foundation design, for example, as well as pre-ordering key components 
and materials to fit into the contractor's construction programme, 
manufacture of items for incorporation into the works and critical 
decisions regarding the implementation of management procedures and the 
resolution of contractor's potential claims.


The scale and pace of the project appear to have placed a considerable 
strain on the cost reporting procedures to keep up to date. Further, the 
extent to which the budget was fixed very early in design development - 
when many of the building elements were covered by provisional sums in 
cost estimates and in tender documentation - means that the causes of the 
cost increases reported are difficult to identify.
However, of more interest is Ewright's recommendation following the 
financial review. This involved a small change in 'structural context', 
designed - it would appear - to limit some of the freedom which Blackmore 
in particular enjoyed on Dreadnought. And yet it was this freedom to be 
decisive and authoritative which appears to have been central to the YDS 
involvement - represented primarily by Blackmore - in the entire project 
and to the procurement of the new facility within such tight constraints 
of time and finance.
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The origin of projects: the source of the discrepancy
The nature of the discrepancy
Defining the scope of the facility required: the initiating phase of 
definition

The involvement of construction in the definition process
a
V)

Structures for the management of definition
The integrating phase of definition

YDS 
et al 
per se. 
et al 
perse.
The initiation of impetus
The integrating phase of impetus
The contribution of construction to impetus

The corporate phase of impetus
et 
al, 
et al, 

The origin of change: the source of the discrepancy
Impetus

The corporate phase of definition
et al 
The corporate phase of determination of context
Detailed changes to project organisation

et al 
et al 
Changing technical definition
CARs 
Changing financial definition
The constraint of a funding limit
Availability of finance

Anticipating change
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Construction involvement in investment decisions
Construction as an investment process
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Defining the nature and extent
of capital investment projects
Getting investment proposals
approved and implemented
DETERMINATION OF CONTEXT 
Determining structure to influence 
definition, approval and implementation
Corporate planning; executive 
appointment; stimulating ideas for 
investment projects
Inviting/rejecting outline 
proposals; final authorisation.
Determining/agree ing structural 
context
Aggregate financial 
"Can we afford itT
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"wants"
Product/Market 
"How, when, where 
and at what cost?"
The businesses 
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"want"
Corporate 
needs
Subunit and 
construction needs
Identifying 'discrepancies' at the level of 
Products/Markets or individual projects
This project is worth funding." 
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to make it more worthwhile".
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3.4 Using available capacity in 'C' Block
This option is not recommended for the following reasons:-
a) The 200 kilo granulator currently situated in "C" Block, 
combined with the K2 based capacity, will not provide the 350 
tonnes annual capacity requested by GTC.
b) The provision of a permanent Cephalosporin facility in "C"
i
Block does not meet the Cephalosporin segregation policy of 
Glaxo Pharmaceuticals.
c) The space in "C" Block has been provisionally earmarked for 
the temporary USA Cefuroxime Axetil granule production 
facility being progressed in parallel to this project.
4. PROPOSAL
It is proposed that:
4.1 The building to house the manufacturing of Cefuroxime Axetil 
granule for suspension will be an extension to the existing orals 
facility (K2) and situated along the east side of 'K' Block. 
(Appendix 2 refers).
4.2   The extension will accommodate all process stages involved in the 
manufacture of the granules and link directly to the existing 
oral's facility. Packaging will take place on the existing 'K' 
Block packaging floor with direct access from the proposed 
extension. Existing changing rooms and service facilities will be 
utilised where possible.
4.3 The building will have a total floor area of 1732m2 and provides 
for 4 production floors plus M/E plant space. (Appendices 3 to 6 
show floor plans).
4.4 The building shell itself is a steel frame" construction clad in 
protected profiled metal sheeting above a dwarf brick wall.
4 5 The internal structure of the building is designed around the main 
process plant, consisting of two 500kg batch size fluidised bed 
mixer-dryer-granulators.
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4.6 The equipment and air-conditioning of the building is designed to 
provide for both GMP and the Occupational Hygiene requirements of 
the materials handled.
Features include:
a) All stages of manufacture are in enclosed plant and use 
gravity feed and vacuum conveying system to minimise exposure 
to the internal and external environment and staff.
b) All HVAC is controlled by the existing Building Management 
System to ensure maintenance of correct air flow patterns.
4.7 To provide a filling and packaging capacity to match the 
manufacturing capacity, it is proposed that an automated bottle 
filling and packaging line is purchased and installed in the 'K' 
Block packaging area. This new line, together with the existing 
granule packaging line, will provide the required capacity.
4.8 In order to provide adequate administrative and service facilities 
for the original filling and packaging department, together with 
the three new oral production units and to incorporate the service 
staff, from the support areas, into the newly created 
Manufacturing Centre of Excellence for Cephalosporins, it is 
proposed to extend the present open-plan office area.
The following appendices give more information on the proposal. 
Appendix Content
} Site plan showing location of 'K' Block.
2 'K' Block showing extension.
3 Ground Floor plan.
4 Service Floor plan.
5 First Floor plan.
5 Second Floor plan.
7 Cross-section,
g Process flow,
o Prespend requirements.
JQ Launch estimates.
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1981 Plan 27,195
£000
3,463
2,735
3,610
2,682
2,333
2
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,899
,157
,605
,994
,491
2,968
39,937
Capi tal Employed at
beginning of Year
£000
Cash
Flow
£000
Net Capital
Expend i ture
£000
10,329
11,846
14,045
21,060
16,796
13,761
11, 413
14,024
13,506
5,337
2,711 (2,685) 
28,217
598
598
578
441
112
719
521
741
586
203
200
5,297
To demonstrate tha't the future does not hold dissimilar oppor- 
tunities there is profit potential on products which have already been 
defined.
1981-1982
1982-1984 
1982-1983 
1985
Kenya Vickers 1 MBT's balance of contract plus spares
Nigeria Vickers 1 MBT's, ARV's, Bridgelayers and spares
MoD ARV's as replacement for sales to Jordan.
MCV 80 Turrets for 50% of the 2000 vehicles - say 
1000 turrets.
If one now takes a totally downside view there is at least an 
opportunity for 1000 turrets on MCV 80 from 1985 onwards but the 
question is on our present cost structure and geographical layout - 
how do we get to 1985?
We cannot go on persuading people of our aspirations to be a 
credible source of hardware systems without an outward manifestation of 
our intentions and to do this we must make a major change in direction. 
I simply do not believe that we will even get to 1985 to take advantage 
of the business opportunities.
Cont./....
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PROGRAMME OF CONSTRUCTION WORKS
The level of construction costs included in the Cost Plan are 
based on r.he following programme:-
1. Design brief frozen February 1981
Design and preparation of 
invitation to tender and 
contract documentation February - May 1981
Select contractors March 1981
A. Tender period
5. Tender approval
6. Start on site
7. Completion of contract
May
- July 1981 
July 1981 
August 1981 
July 1982
The prices are based on current tendering, trends, the market being 
very competitive vith only marginal changes in the levels of tenders 
received over the past few months. It is anticipated that the tender 
would be based on the cost of construction at May/June 1981 levels.
340
PROJECT DREADNOUGHT 
PROJECT MANAGEMENT SERVICES
1 . Scope of Project
1.1 Size and Nature
fy
The project consists of a simple shed of approximately 30,000m 
for use as a medium/heavy engineering workshop with facilities 
for fabrication, light and heavy machinery, and finishing and 
assembly. Overhead cranage and basic mechanical and electrical 
services are to be provided wit;; in the shell. Office and 
welfare facilities of approximately A,OOGm are to be provided in 
free standing Portakabin units linked to the shed. External works 
will comprise ancillary buildings accommodating electrical 
substations, compressor houses, stores, etc., together with 
drainage, roadworks, car parking, fencing and landscaping. The 
estimated contract value at current prices is £6.6M.
1.2 Time Scale
1. Design brief frozen February 1981
2. Design and preparation of invitation
	to tender and contract documentation February /May 1981
3. Select contractors March 1981
4. Tender period May /July 1981
5. Tender approval July 1981
6. Start on site August 1981
7. Completion of contract June 1982
" . 3 Construction Contract
C repetitive Develop and Construct tenders will be sought from 
up to A contractors on the basis of outline designs and 
Jocunc-nts containing a Design Development Brief and Conditions 
of Tender. Selection of a tender will be on the basis of value 
for money with respect to total price and the suitability of 
contractors detailed proposals for the development of the design.
2 . Project. Ma:;age:r.<?nt Services
2. 1 Fre contract
VV>~~w:Il acu to secure the most advantageous design and price 
for L'.e project, and in particular:
2.1.1 U'e vill take and analyse client's requirements and 
are outline designs.
2.1.2 \ve vill »arry out, as appropriate, necessary investigations 
into site conditions and will instruct specialists on 
jv ur behol f. We vill ascertain the requirements of the
authorities etc. likely to «: i'oct the, design 
s Je tailed development .^
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2.1.A We will assist in the selection of contractors for 
inclusion in the tender list.
2.1.5 We will issue all necessary documents to competing 
tenderers, and during the tender period will issue 
to contractors any updating material required by you and 
will deal with contractors questions.
2.1.6 We will evaluate tenders and contractors detailed proposals
and make recommendations to you on the placing of a contract.
2.2 Contract Stage
We will act on your behalf in carrying out the duties of the 
Employer within the terms of the contract. In particular we will:
2.2.1 Site Supervision and Quality Control
We will provide the necessary architectural, structural, 
mechanical and electrical engineering personnel to supervise 
the construction of the work in collaboration with a Clerk 
of Works to be appointed by you for the duration of the 
contract. We will provide the necessary services for dealing 
with unforeseen contingencies arising from underground conditions 
and existing structures as they may arise and will agree 
appropriate courses of action with the contractor and report 
to you on cost or other implications.
2.2.2 Progress and Liaison
We will undertake to convene and attend regular progress 
meetings with the contractor and will deal with them on a 
day to day basis over such matters as details of the phasing, 
access, temporary works and so on. We will report to you 
regularly on progress and on all matters affecting the 
continuation of your production in existing and new buildings.
2.2.3 Financial Control
We will ur-.-iertake to agree with the contractor a payment plan 
and will value and certify regular monthly payments. We will 
be responsible for advising you of the financial implications 
of any proposed alteration to the design, or any othr-r 
variation to the contract and will undertake the negotiation 
of the cost of any variation in accordance with the procedure 
laid doxv*n in the contract. We will, if appropriate, undertake 
to check and agree claims for increases in the cost of labour 
and materials in accordance with the NEDO formula for the 
fluctuating price parts of the contract.
2.2.A Design
-We will collaborate with you in the .preparation of further 
cdesign briefs required for the completion of the contract and
 will ensure ;Viat your requirements are properly incorporated 
in the produ< tion drawings prepared by the contractor.
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2.2.5 Commissioning
We will, supervise the testing and commissioning of the 
mechanical and electrical engineering services in the building 
and will test performance of installations against design 
criteria and will report to you and recommend acceptance on 
completion of commissioning.
2.2.6 Defects
In accordance with the terms of the contract we will undertake 
to prepare defects lists covering all fault arising from 
materials and workmanship not in accordance with the contract 
at the appropriate time in relation to the completion of each 
phase. We will check the making good of defects before 
authorising final release of retention to the contractor.
2.2.7 Final Account
We will undertake responsibility for preparing a final account 
between you and the contractor and authorising a final settlement,
3. Terms of Engagement
3.1 Our fees for the work are fixed and firm on the following basis:
Project Management Services Precontract are from 1 March 1981 to 
31 July 1981.
Project Management Services at Contract Stage are for a construction 
programme from 1 August 1981 to 30 June 1982, and final discharge 
of defects liability and winding up of the final ..ccount by 
1 August 1983.
Our engagement will in the first place cover precontract stage 
services only, with a further engagement for contract stage services 
to be made on the letting of a contract. In the event of the 
abandonment of the project durir,-;, the course of either stage, the fee
_ .. v"1 - . . - i   ' - i .._- ' ^  . - .... .._. _._ _ r .".. ._.__ ' . .. .. i. _----_ ..j-C W JL. JL i. t/C ij «_» ;j v_ >_A ^'.i i_iltJ ^/i«_/ | ->.'ii.i.tJii *~>i. LiiO LOl-CLi. ^Oi-tN. oj.i-<-:«_^.^
carried out by the "Project Managers. No fee will be payable in 
respect of the contract stage services if the project is abandoned 
.- 3 uring the pre contract stage.
3.2 All communication vith L'.-.a contractor concerning the building contract 
is to be through the project managers.
3.3 We authorise all payments to the contractor within the terms of ehe 
contract.
3.4 A competent Clerk of Works will be appointed by you to carry out 
i.he functions of cunlity control and progress monitoring 
throughout t'.K period of construction.
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(1) FACTORY - MAIN BUILDING 
55 metres (3 bays) wide 
by 546 metres (91 bays) 
long steel frames and metal 
sheeted and incorporating 
R.C. bases for a large 
number and variety of 
machines tools.
Foundations and machine bases: 
full design by Contractor.
Frame and Shell: Outline design 
by Employer's Agents (E.A.) 
detailed design by Contractor.
Mechanical and Electrical Services: 
full design by E.A.
Contractor
Contractor
Contractor
Contractor's price in tend
Contractor's price in tendi
Contractor's price in tende
(2) FACTORY - OFFICE WING
Attached wing 30 metre (2 bay) 
vide by 108 metre (18 bay) 
long including a first floor 
gallery 12 metres wide x 
108 metres long.
Foundations: Full design by 
Contractor
Frame, Shell, Gallery structure, 
Main Toilets: outline design 
by Employer's Agents (E.A.) 
detailed design by Contractor.
Gables, office/factory partitions, 
subsidiary toilets, fitting out, 
mechanical and electrical services.
Full design by Employer's Agents
Contractor
Contractor
Employer 1 s 
Agents
Contractor's price.in tendc
Contractor's price in tende'
Contractor's price in tend- 
on Provisional Bill prepar 
by E.A.
(3) FACTORY - INTEGRAL ANCILLARIES 
Attached to North Bay of 
factory on one or two levels
3.1 Spray booths in fitting area.
3.2 Electroplating shop adjacent 
to fitting area.
3.3 Spray booth and shot blast 
in Fabrication Area.
) Employer's Requirements to be 
\ determined
)To be
)determined
\ Provisional Sum for desi
\ construction and servicir
\ included in tender.
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3.4 4 No. Substations
3.5 2 No. Compressor Houses
3.6 1 No. Gas Meter and Water 
Intake Ho.
3.7 5 No. Toilet Blocks
Outline design by E.A. 
detailed design by 
Contractor
)Contractor Contractor's price in-ter
(4) FACTORY - EXTERNAL ANCILLARIES
Adjacent to South Bay of factory
4.1 Oil Storage Facilities
4.2 Paint Storage Facilities
4.3 Gas Storage Facilities
Employer's Requirements to 
be determined
To be
determined
Provisional Sum for 
construction and serviciS.^^
included in tender. rv
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(5) TANK TESTING FACILITIES 
Buildings and structures 
located on south side of 
Factory/Office buildings
5.1 Suppression 'Shed'
5.2 Gun Control
5.3 Ramps to River
5.4 Winch Test
5.5 Water Test
5.6 Tilt Test
5.7 M.E.X.E. Bridge Test Blocks
5.8 Suspension Tests (bumps)
) Outline design by E.A.
) detailed design by
) Contractor
Provisional Sum for desig 
construction and servicin 
included in tender.
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